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THE RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM BIG DATA
AS A PUBLIC RESOURCE
MARY D. FAN*
The information that we reveal from interactions online and with electronic devices
has massive value—for both private profit and public benefit, such as improving
health, safety, and even commute times. Who owns the lucrative big data that we
generate through the everyday necessity of interacting with technology? Calls for
legal regulation regarding how companies use our data have spurred laws and proposals framed by the predominant lens of individual privacy and the right to control and delete data about oneself. By focusing on individual control over droplets
of personal data, the major consumer privacy regimes overlook the important question of rights in the big data ocean.
This Article is the first to frame a right of the public to benefit from our consumer
big data. Drawing on insights from property theory, regulatory advances, and open
innovation, the Article introduces a model that permits controlled access and the
use of big data for public interest purposes while protecting against privacy harms,
among others. I propose defining a right of access to pooled personal data for
public purposes, with sensitive information safeguarded by a controlled-access procedure akin to that used by institutional review boards in medical research today.
To encourage companies to voluntarily share data for public interest purposes, the
Article also proposes regulatory sandboxes and safe harbors akin to those successfully deployed in other domains, such as antitrust, financial technology, and intellectual property law.
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INTRODUCTION
In a classic story, hungry travelers with an empty pot come upon
a wary village with scant food.1 The travelers set up their empty pot,

R

R

R
R
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1 As with many narratives in the public domain, there are many variations of the story.
See, e.g., MARCIA BROWN, STONE SOUP: AN OLD TALE (1947) (the Stone Soup story with
hungry soldiers); JON J. MUTH, STONE SOUP (2003) (retelling the Stone Soup story with
monks rather than soldiers); Sue Kimmel, Stone Soup: A Story About Using Story for
Research, 19 SCH. LIBRARIES WORLDWIDE 1, 2 (2013) (discussing published adaptations
and variations of Stone Soup); Tom Chapin, Stone Soup, on MOTHER EARTH ALBUM
(Cherry Lane Music 1992) (singing a variation of Stone Soup); cf. James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33, 44–46 (2003) (discussing the rich productivity that has arisen from the
analogous free and open-source software movements and decrying the privatization of the
“commons of the mind” and resulting chilling of such creative productivity).

R
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light a fire, and select stones to boil.2 Enticed by the idea that one can
make food from stones, villagers emerge, intrigued, and begin to contribute their scarce provisions—a carrot here, a potato there, some
herbs, and so forth, until a Stone Soup emerges, enough to feed the
whole group. A bounty with the potential to benefit the larger group
emerges from amassing seemingly small individual contributions.3
But who owns the soup? Who has the right to use (or here, derive
nourishment from) it? Would it be fair if the travelers with the pot—
the infrastructure to cook the soup—and the creative spark to entice
individual contributions claimed sole rights to control and use the
soup? And to get more sophisticated, should different levels of contributors get different bundles of rights to the soup?
We have some intuitive answers to the Stone Soup metaphor that
has persisted across centuries and cultures.4 The usual outcome of the
traditional story, after all, is that the group shares in the benefits—not
that the clever providers of the pot and enticing idea get it all.
Moving from the timeless to the timely questions of our era, we
contribute data to a massive, growing pool every time we use the
Internet or the Internet-of-things—the billions of smart devices like
Amazon’s Echo, Apple Watches, or Fitbits that are connected to the
Internet and sharing our data.5 In 2013, Norwegian research group
SINTEF reported that ninety percent of the world’s data had been

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 36 Side B
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2 This retelling, in broad strokes, is a composite of the many variations of the story
discussed supra note 1.
3 The analogy, of course, is the power gained from pooling data from individual
information or cases. See, e.g., MARY D. FAN, CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING,
PRIVACY, AND AUDIOVISUAL BIG DATA 117–21 (2019) [hereinafter FAN, CAMERA
POWER] (discussing the predictive power gained by pooling together many small events
and applying advanced analytics); Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward
Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051 (2016)
(discussing the insights to be gained from examining patterns across cases, rather than
myopically constraining focus on the individual case); EUR. COMM’N, STUDY ON BIG DATA
IN PUBLIC HEALTH, TELEMEDICINE, AND HEALTHCARE: FINAL REPORT 46–54 (2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/bigdata_report_en.pdf (reporting
findings about how big data aggregation and analytics have led to improvements and
advances in public health and medicine, and recommending strategies to facilitate big data
pooling and access).
4 For a genealogy of how the Stone Soup story has spread from the 1700s to our time
and across cultures, see William Rubel, History of the Stone Soup Folktale from 1720 to
Now, STONESOUP (Sept. 2015), https://stonesoup.com/about-the-childrens-art-foundationand-stone-soup-magazine/history-of-the-stone-soup-story-from-1720-to-now.
5 See, e.g., Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of
Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 426–28 (2018) (discussing the wealth of information amassing
from users accessing the Internet-of-things); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Collateralizing
Privacy, 78 TUL. L. REV. 553, 564–67 (2004) (discussing the aggregation of consumer data
into valuable datasets and databases).
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generated in the preceding two years.6 By 2020, the volume was projected to grow to forty-four zettabytes—forty times more bytes than
the number of stars in the observable universe—according to the
World Economic Forum.7 The vast volumes of data facilitate the
training and deployment of advanced analytical techniques that power
artificial intelligence, including machine learning.8
Pooled together and processed using advanced analytics, the data
and findings could be powerfully deployed for both private profit and
public benefit—if the data were accessible for use. Vast volumes of
data are valuable for advanced analytical techniques, such as machine
learning, to address a range of goals, such as predicting and preventing
disease, understanding the spread of misinformation, and improving
traffic congestion.9 The data also can be used for commercial advantage, to expand markets, tailor offerings, sell more products, or even
exploit cognitive weaknesses to get people to overspend or waive
rights.10
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6 See SINTEF, Big Data, for Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated over
Last Two Years, SCIENCEDAILY (May 22, 2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2013/05/130522085217.htm.
7 Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-eachday-cf4bddf29f.
8 For an overview of machine learning techniques see, for example, ETHEM
ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI (2016). For an accessible overview of the
relevant concepts aimed at attorneys and non-technical readers, see Ai Deng, An Antitrust
Lawyer’s Guide to Machine Learning, 32 ANTITRUST 82, 82 (2018).
9 See, e.g., Kyle Wiggers, Google Cloud Releases Covid-19 Data Sets to Foster
Coronavirus-Fighting AI Models, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 30, 2020, 9:39 AM), https://
venturebeat.com/2020/03/30/google-launches-covid-19-public-datasets-program-to-fostercoronavirus-fighting-ai-models (reporting on free datasets and analytical programs that
Google Cloud is releasing to help train machine learning models to help prevent the spread
of COVID-19); Gary King & Nathaniel Persily, Unprecedented Facebook URLs Dataset
Now Available for Academic Research Through Social Science One, SOC. SCI. ONE (Feb.
13, 2020) [hereinafter King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset], https://socialscience.one/
blog/unprecedented-facebook-urls-dataset-now-available-research-through-social-scienceone (announcing the release of “one of the largest social science datasets ever
constructed” in collaboration with Facebook to study elections and the spread of
information and misinformation); Nicole Dungca, In First, Uber to Share Ride Data with
Boston, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/13/
uber-share-ridership-data-with-boston/4Klo40KZREtQ7jkoaZjoNN/story.html (reporting
that Uber is sharing ride data information with city officials, starting with Boston, in an
effort to study strategies to reduce traffic congestion); Alyssa Newcomb, Why Uber Is
Sharing Ride Data with the City of Boston, ABC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:16 AM), https://
abcnews.go.com/Technology/uber-sharing-ride-data-city-boston/story?id=28188898
(reporting that city officials will use Uber shared data to study ways to reduce traffic
congestion).
10 See, e.g., Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini,
Jonathan Maer, Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings
from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACT., Nov.
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Access to big data as a public resource is important to address
pressing questions that cannot be answered without the data and to
correct imbalances in access to information and control over knowledge. For example, are there patterns in how major social media companies filter, censor, or promote the news and content that people
receive by ideology, race, and other potentially invidious factors?11
How do data and information flows influence the rise of violent
extremism?12 How might our data be used against us to discriminate
in the provision of services, advertisements, special deals, pricesetting, and access to opportunities?13 Is there racial profiling in the
algorithms that determine whether and what content reaches

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 37 Side B
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2019, art. 81 (presenting findings of dark patterns, user interfaces designed to trick and
confuse users, used in websites targeting consumers); Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 81–82 (2021)
(discussing the proliferations of dark patterns in user interface designs and reporting the
results of an experiment that shows the power of dark patterns to manipulate consumers);
Christopher Bosch, Benjamin Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher,
Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 2016 PROC.
PRIV. ENHANCING TECH 237 (presenting examples of dark patterns in design).
11 See, e.g., Shannon Bond, Facebook and Twitter Limit Sharing New York Post Story
About Joe Biden, NPR (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/14/
923766097/facebook-and-twitter-limit-sharing-new-york-post-story-about-joe-biden
(discussing controversy over the decision by Facebook and Twitter to limit sharing of a
media story and the lack of clarity or transparency over how algorithms restrict or allow
sharing); Bianca Bruno, Google & YouTube Accused of Racial Profiling, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SVC. (June 18, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/google-youtube-accused-ofracial-profiling (reporting on a federal class action alleging racial profiling in how
algorithms filter and censor content); Gail Sullivan, How Facebook and Twitter Control
What You See About Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2014, 3:43 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/19/how-facebook-and-twittercontrol-what-you-see-about-ferguson (discussing concerns over how information regarding
fiercely partisan events like the Ferguson protests over policing is disseminated or shared).
12 See, e.g., INES VON BEHR, ANAÏS REDING, CHARLIE EDWARDS & LUKE GRIBBON,
RADICALISATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA iii (2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf (discussing the need for
empirical research on radicalization and the extreme difficulty in getting access to data);
Emerson T. Brooking & P.W. Singer, War Goes Viral: How Social Media Is Being
Weaponized Around the World, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goes-viral/501125 (discussing new dilemmas raised by the
convergence of physical violence, information warfare, and online speech for companies
and how platforms can be used in such warfare).
13 See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMM. ACM
44, 46–53 (2013) (discussing racial profiling and biases in advertising content, such as using
advertisements suggesting arrest for persons with Black-identified names); Nathan
Newman, Comment on FTC Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? Workshop: How
Big Data Enables Economic Harm to Consumers, Especially to Low-Income and Other
Vulnerable Sectors of the Population (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_comments/2014/08/00015-92370.pdf (collecting concerns over the use
and misuse of consumer data to engage in price discrimination, information content
delivery, and the availability or denial of opportunities).
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viewers?14 How do internet bots and trolls spread viral patterns of
misinformation and potentially even influence vital decisions such as
presidential elections or COVID-19 vaccine refusal?15 There are
major potential distributional consequences for who or what entities
get to benefit from our pooled personal information—and who is
locked out.16 Big data access also is important to better inform law
and policy. Governmental institutions, such as administrative agencies
and courts, increasingly seek more rigorous empirical information to
guide decisions and policies, but key data may not be available or may
be privately controlled.17
Who has the right to control the data is a major issue that legislatures are beginning to confront—usually from the perspective of individual privacy.18 The individual privacy protection framework is
important but does not address the larger overarching question about
who gets to use and benefit from the valuable amassed data, which are
currently often held by private companies. Many companies have
adopted restrictive policies on voluntary sharing of information that
risk blocking socially valuable research or potentially biasing studies
14
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See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Restitution and
Damages, Newman v. Google, No. 20-cv-04011 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2020), ECF No. 1
(alleging that Google and YouTube algorithms discriminate against Black content creators
and consumers).
15 See, e.g., LEE RAINIE, JANNA ANDERSON & JONATHAN ALBRIGHT, PEW RSCH. CTR.,
THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH, TROLLS, ANONYMITY, AND FAKE NEWS ONLINE 2–5
(2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2017/03/
PI_2017.03.29_Social-Climate_FINAL.pdf (discussing rising questions and concerns over
internet bots, trolls, and manipulative behaviors affecting important issues such as
elections).
16 See, e.g., EMMA ROOKSBY & JOHN WECKERT, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE, at vi–vii (2007) (discussing the distributive justice problems raised by
severe inequalities in access to information); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM
THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT 109 (2001) (discussing how lack of information and access to
knowledge creates systematic inequality, “severe barriers to participation in a pluralistic
process,” and unequally distributes political power).
17 See, e.g., Christian Leuz, Evidence-Based Policy-Making: Promise, Challenges, and
Opportunities for Accounting and Financial Markets Research, 48 ACCTG. & BUS. RSCH.
582, 583, 589 (2018) (discussing the rise of evidence-based policy-making and how lack of
data is the biggest challenge to meeting calls for more rigorous empirical evidence);
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 2 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT § 11:17 (2d ed. 2021)
(noting that “[e]mpirical evidence or the lack of it will often play an important role in the
application” of the Supreme Court’s standard for regulation of commercial speech and
collecting cases by courts expressing concern over the lack of empirical data and the need
for more rigorous evidence regarding the rationales of governmental bodies for regulating
commercial speech and the impact of such regulation).
18 For a discussion of recent legislative proposals and laws at the federal and state
levels, and in the European Union, see infra Sections I.A–B.
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and results.19 The lens of privacy protection leads to laws and regulations focused on an individual’s control over personal data.20 Yet an
individual’s data point is just a drop in the sea of what is valuable,
powerful, possibly dangerous, and potentially beneficial about pooled
data points.21
This Article fills the gap, framing and making the case for a right
to use and benefit from our pooled consumer data. Commercial entities provide the infrastructure to attract and collect our data, but the
pooled data has a public resource nature in several respects.22 First,
we are all contributing to the generation of the resource through our
activities and interactions with online platforms and devices. Second,
private control and ownership does not put the resource of our pooled
data to its socially optimal use—and indeed may be conducive to
nefarious uses, as the current concerns over dark patterns and political
manipulation show.23 Third, nonexclusive access could put the
resource to its socially optimal use, because such access would
enhance healthy commerce and prevent private capture that stunts
realization of the full utility of our pooled electronic data.24
Of course, our collective electronic data is a more complicated
form of resource than traditional commons or group property such as
coastal fisheries, roadways, common fields, or waterway access.
Because data are intangible and reproducible, the danger of mismanagement and uncontrolled access is not depletion, but rather privacy
and misuse harms.25 Further, commercial entities provide the infra-

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 38 Side B
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19 See, e.g., David M.J. Lazer et al., Computational Social Science: Obstacles and
Opportunities, 369 SCIENCE 1060, 1060 (2020) (noting “many companies have been steadily
cutting back data that can be pulled from their platforms” because of regulations or
scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal, resulting in the closing of “avenues of
potentially valuable research” and a voluntary, arbitrary data-sharing system that is
“intrinsically unreliable and potentially biased in the science it produces”).
20 For a discussion of provisions reflecting this focus, see infra Sections I.A–B.
21 See, e.g., Alex Romanov, How Much or Too Little? Assigning a Dollar Value to Big
Data, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:30 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2013/11/05/dataworth (explaining how the “small . . . value[] assigned to each individual data point—even
as little as a few cents—multiplied by large numbers . . . equals the potential for significant
return on investment”).
22 For a discussion of characteristics of certain properties or resources that make them
more akin to public property rather than better kept under private ownership, see, for
example, Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713–23, 774–77 (1986).
23 See, e.g., Tom McKay, Senators Introduce Bill to Stop ‘Dark Patterns’ Huge Platforms
Use to Trick Users, GIZMODO (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/senatorsintroduce-bill-to-stop-dark-patterns-huge-plat-1833929276 (discussing legislative proposal
to address concerns); Mathur et al., supra note 10, at 244 (cataloguing examples); Bosch et
al., supra note 10 (same).
24 See discussion infra Part II.
25 See discussion infra Part III.
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26 See, e.g., Mark Birkin, Spatial Data Analytics of Mobility with Consumer Data, 76 J.
TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 245, 250–51 (2019) (“Since consumer data arise as the product of a
commercial transaction between an organization and its customers the data are typically
owned and controlled by business organisations which are external to the academic
sector.”).
27 See discussion infra Sections I.A–B.
28 See discussion infra notes 65–85 and accompanying text.
29 See discussion infra Section II.A.
30 See discussion infra Sections II.B, III.B.
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structure and impetus for us to provide data, have default control over
access, and enjoy potential copyright and trade secret protections for
the data compilations.26 But while there are limits to the analogy,
there also are important lessons to gain.
Recognizing that our pooled personal data has a public-resource
nature opens our vision to the great promise and peril of shared access
and important lessons on governance. This right of access to our
pooled data for research in the public interest can build off the current
baseline of property protections in data compilations that companies
have invested in creating. The Article also proposes a controlledaccess approach to maximize the public benefit potential of shared use
of our pooled data while protecting people from privacy harms,
among others.
The Article illuminates how at least two areas of law designed
with for-profit transactions as the paradigm have the side effect of
disincentivizing data sharing for nonprofit public interest purposes.
The two major privacy regimes in force today, the European Union’s
General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) and the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), largely overlook the importance of
access to our pooled consumer big data for nonprofit and public
interest purposes in their focus on business use of personal information.27 More problematically, these regimes potentially chill sharing of
the data to benefit the public because of stringent requirements and
penalties for privacy violations.28 Second, trade secret law’s protections depend on keeping valuable information secret.29 The Article
offers proposals to reform these unintended adverse consequences.30
Now is an opportune time to investigate and frame the right of
the public to benefit from our data collected by private entities.
Recently proposed legislation in the United States and European
Union are making early forays into crafting limited data-sharing obligations. Introduced in the House of Representatives in late May 2021,
the U.S. Social Media Disclosure and Transparency of Advertisements
Act would require digital platform giants with more than 100 million
monthly active users to share targeted advertisement data with aca-
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31 Social Media Disclosure and Transparency of Advertisements Act of 2021 (Social
Media DATA Act), H.R. 3451, 117th Cong. (introduced May 20, 2021).
32 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single
Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, arts.
25(1), 26(1), 31, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN.
33 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), arts. 2(10), 15–22, COM (2020) 767
final (Nov. 25, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A52020PC0767.
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demic researchers.31 In the European Union, the European
Parliament and member states are considering the proposed Digital
Services Act, which obligates “very large online platforms,” with
average monthly active user bases of 45 million or more, to give data
access to “vetted researchers . . . for the sole purpose” of researching
“systemic risks” posed by use of the platforms.32 European Union
members also are considering another proposal, the Data Governance
Act, which contains provisions to facilitate the development of “data
altruism organizations” that serve as intermediaries to make available
pooled data consensually shared by people for “altruistic purposes”
such as scientific research or improving public services.33 While limited in scope and subject-matter, these proposals are valuable early
efforts towards the larger issue this Article addresses, of access to privately controlled consumer data.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how concerns
over the ways in which companies control and use our data has led to
a proliferation of legislative proposals and laws attempting to regulate
consumer data. This Part argues that the predominant focus on individual privacy spurring this first wave of laws is important but also
myopic, failing to address the larger overarching question regarding
the right of the public to benefit from the collection of our data by
private entities.
Part II advances the case for recognizing the shared public
resource nature of our amassed data, drawing on property theory and
insights from open innovation movements. This Part argues that while
private entities may provide the infrastructure and enticements to
amass the information, there remains a right of the public to benefit
from our individual contributions. Moreover, recognizing the public’s
right to benefit is in the interest of private entities that currently control our amassed consumer data as well as in the interest of the public.
Part III addresses important concerns that expanding access to
researchers whose work provides a public benefit raises privacy concerns and may limit incentives for private investments in cultivating
and safeguarding the data. Drawing insights from commons-
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governance theory and time-tested protections for human subjects in
research, this Part proposes a controlled-access model for providing
public benefits from use and access while reducing the risk of privacy
harms, among others. A right to use our amassed data for public benefit does not mean that everyone gets to access and use the sensitive
data. Rather, access and use should be governed by the wellestablished principles and safeguards that have led to lifesaving
research using some of our most sensitive, protected, and private
data—health information. Insights and experiences from the regulation of human subjects research show the feasibility of recognizing a
right of access to pooled personal data for research in the public
interest while addressing privacy and related concerns.
I
PRIVACY MYOPIA: FOCUSING ON DATA DROPLETS,
MISSING THE BIG DATA OCEAN

11/18/2021 14:12:20

34 BROOKE AUXIER, LEE RAINIE, MONICA ANDERSON, ANDREW PERRIN, MADHU
KUMAR & ERICA TURNER, AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED, AND
FEELING LACK OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 8 (2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confusedand-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information. For information on the
survey’s size, see The American Trends Panel, PEW RSCH. CTR. (2019) [hereinafter
American Trends Survey Methodology], https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/u-s-surveyresearch/american-trends-panel (reporting 10,000-plus panelists).
35 AUXIER ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
36 Id.
37 Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: Designing for
Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customerdata-designing-for-transparency-and-trust.
38 Id.
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Public discontent over control, access, and use of personal data is
brewing—and with it the seeds of democratic change via legislation. A
recent nonpartisan Pew Research Center survey of a random sample
of more than 10,000 Americans found that 79% are concerned over
how companies use collected personal data.34 Americans overwhelmingly (72%) believe their consumer data is not being used to benefit
them.35 Rather, Americans are widely aware (77%) that companies
use the data to profile them, engage in targeted advertising, and assess
their riskiness as customers.36 Consumers in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and India—who, along with Americans, represent the
largest portion of online users—have similarly widespread concern
over how companies use their data, according to a 2014 survey.37 The
survey found that 97% of respondents were concerned about misuse
of their data.38
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To address the exponential increase of personal data that companies are amassing and concerns over how it is used, laws and legislative proposals are emerging in states, the U.S. Congress, and the
European Union. As discussed below, most of the focus in this first
wave of legislation is on personal control over individual data and privacy protection. While the privacy-oriented laws and proposals
address one facet of the rising concern over the use of amassed data,
they leave unanswered other important access and distributional concerns about who gets to use and benefit from the pooled data collected from the public and held in privatized silos. The legislative
fomentation around consumer data privacy presents fertile ground for
fresh approaches to the control, access, and use of our pooled personal data—but also reveals gaps in regulation, as discussed below.
A.

What the World’s Strongest Consumer Privacy Protection
Paradigm Misses

11/18/2021 14:12:20

39 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
[hereinafter GDPR].
40 See id. arts. 12–23 (rights of the data subject).
41 See id. arts. 24–43 (obligations of controllers and processors).
42 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
43 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United
States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 880 (2014).
44 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7–8, 2010 O.J. (C 83)
393; see also, e.g., Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade
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The European Union (EU) was the early major mover in defining
individual rights in personal data and the obligations of companies by
enacting the GDPR, which took effect on May 25, 2018.39 The GDPR
offers “data subjects” a data bill of rights.40 The GDPR also requires
data “controller[s]” to implement “data protection by design and by
default,” secure and protect data, and conduct “data protection
impact assessment[s],” among other obligations.41 The additional protections expand on the GDPR’s predecessor in regulation, the 1995
Data Protection Directive.42
Professors Paul Schwartz and Dan Solove have observed a difference in cultural orientations toward privacy rights in the European
Union and the United States: “EU law views privacy as a fundamental
right, while U.S. law considers it one interest that is balanced against
others.”43 The GDPR’s approach reflects this orientation, operationalizing the commitment to the fundamental rights to privacy and
family life expressed in the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.44 The provisions on data user rights and data con-
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troller obligations are so strong that the GDPR “set off a wave of
unease in many data-intensive industries, including health research,
sparking fears that it would effectively curtail their activities.”45 While
the paradigmatic concern may be unscrupulous exploitation and sale
of personal information for profit, the GDPR’s wide sweep even has a
potential chilling effect on data-intensive nonprofit research that
offers important public benefits such as advancing the treatment of
disease and preventing deaths.46
The GDPR specifies three main types of individual rights.47 The
first category of rights is about access to information and notice. Data
subjects have the right to transparent, intelligible communication
about how their information is being processed and how data controllers are responding to their requests to exercise their personal rights in
their data.48 People also have the right to information about the data
controller, their rights, and whether and how their data will be used,
stored, and processed, including access to a copy of that personal
data.49
The second cluster of rights pertains to control over one’s personal data. The GDPR confers a right to rectification of inaccurate
personal data, including supplementation of incomplete information.50
People also have the right to erasure of personal data under certain
conditions, such as withdrawal of consent or if the data are no longer
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Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 89 (2017) (“[T]he
GDPR is a piece of EU legislation that is meant to provide for very high standards of
protection of personal data as an expression of the fundamental rights of EU citizens to
privacy and family life, as embedded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.”).
45 Mark Phillips & Bartha M. Knoppers, Whose Commons? Data Protection as a Legal
Limit of Open Science, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 107 (2019).
46 See Jasper Bovenberg, David Peloquin, Barbara Bierer, Mark Barnes & Bartha
Maria Knoppers, How to Fix the GDPR’s Frustration of Global Biomedical Research, 370
SCIENCE 40, 41–42 (2020) (discussing the barriers the GDPR imposes to data sharing for
lifesaving biomedical research, such as addressing COVID-19); David Peloquin, Michael
DiMaio, Barbara Bierer & Mark Barnes, Disruptive and Avoidable: GDPR Challenges to
Secondary Research Uses of Data, 28 EUROPEAN J. HUM. GENETICS 697, 697–700 (2020)
(discussing the problems posed by the GDPR for secondary research beyond the initially
approved study, and for the development of biobanks and databanks to facilitate
biomedical research); Niamh Clarke, Gillian Vale, Emer P. Reeves, Mary Kirwan, David
Smith, Michael Farrell, Gerard Hurl & Noel G. McElvaney, GDPR: An Impediment to
Research?, 188 IRISH J. MED. SCI. 1129, 1129 (2019) (“At the very least, the regulations, as
applied in Ireland, will place a significant extra burden of work on Ireland’s clinical
researchers and at their worst will force individuals and institutions out of the clinical
research field . . . .”).
47 GDPR, supra note 39, arts. 12–22; see also id. art. 23 (setting forth limitations to the
rights).
48 Id. art. 12.
49 Id. arts. 13–15.
50 Id. art. 16.
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necessary for the purposes collected.51 This implements a variant of
the theoretical “right to be forgotten” that has occasioned much scholarly commentary and advocacy over the last decade and has found
expression in various national and international laws, but not in U.S.
law.52 There also is the right to restrict processing of one’s data under
certain circumstances, such as while one is seeking to rectify errors.53
To fully realize these rights of control, a person, dubbed a data subject, also has the right to have the data controller notify entities that
receive the subject’s data that errors have been rectified, data
processing has been restricted, or the data must be erased.54 The
GDPR also confers a right to the portability of one’s data, including
the right to receive one’s data “in a structured, commonly used and
machine readable format” and to transmit that information to another
data controller.55 The regulations also specify a right to object that the
controller’s use of a person’s data is unlawful.56
Third, the GDPR addresses some of the growing concerns about
profiling and automated decisionmaking facilitated by big data analytics.57 Commentators have expressed concern over the rise of decisionmaking by machine learning algorithms, potentially trained on
biased datasets, to make impactful decisions about people’s lives, such
51

Id. art. 17.
Compare Mosha v. Yandex, Inc., No. 18-CV-5444, 2019 WL 5595037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 30, 2019) (discussing Russian law’s “‘[r]ight to be forgotten’ . . . which allows an
individual to request that search engine operators . . . remove links that are incorrect or
outdated”), and Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) (proposing a framework for online obscurity and arguing it
is less costly to operationalize than the right to be forgotten), and Jeffrey Rosen, The Right
to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012) (“In Europe, the . . . roots of the
right to be forgotten can be found in French law, which recognizes le droit à l’oubli . . . a
right that allows a convicted criminal who has . . . been rehabilitated to object to the
publication of the facts of his conviction and incarceration.”), with Garcia v. Google, Inc.,
786 F.3d 733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] ‘right to be forgotten,’ although recently
affirmed by the Court of Justice for the European Union, is not recognized in the United
States.” (citing Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:616 (May 13, 2014) (obligating Google to respond to requests to
remove personal information))), and Yeager v. Innovus Pharms., Inc., No. 18-cv-397, 2019
WL 447743, at *7 n.6 (“But no ‘right to be forgotten’ exists under United States law.”).
53 GDPR, supra note 39, art. 18.
54 Id. art. 19.
55 Id. art. 20.
56 Id. art. 21.
57 Id. art. 22; see also, e.g., Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/
679, WP251rev.01, at 5 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines]
(noting that advances in technology, “big data analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
learning have made it easier to create profiles and make automated decisions with the
potential to significantly impact individuals’ rights and freedoms”).
52

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 41 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 42 Side A

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU502.txt

November 2021]

unknown

Seq: 14

RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM BIG DATA

15-NOV-21

16:55

1451

as eligibility for jobs, loans, housing and school admissions.58 The
GDPR gives people a right “not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her.”59 Examples of such decisions producing legal effects or
significant impact include automatic refusal on a credit application or
e-recruiting automatic screens without human involvement.60
The GDPR recognizes exceptions to the right against automated
decisionmaking, such as consent or contractual necessity.61 The
GDPR also permits a member state or a European Union law to
authorize automated decisionmaking, if the authority “lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests.”62 The GDPR’s provisions on automated decisionmaking do not comprehensively address the full range of objections raised to the practice, such as the “black box” nontransparent
nature of algorithms used to make decisions.63 The GDPR is, however, one of the first enacted major efforts to regulate automated
decisionmaking.64
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58 For some of the rich literature on concerns over profiling and automated
decisionmaking, see, for example, VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); ANDREW GUTHRIE
FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016). See also, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human
Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611, 636–54 (2020) (contrasting machine action and human
decisionmaking and comparing concerns about both); Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide
and Equality in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. 331, 343–59 (2020)
(cataloguing problems with algorithmic decisionmaking); C éline Castets-Renard,
Accountability of Algorithms in the GDPR and Beyond: A European Legal Framework on
Automated Decision-Making, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 91, 99
(2019) (“[B]ig data analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning’s capabilities
have significantly facilitated the creation of profiles and automated decisions with the
potential to impact individual’s rights and freedoms—especially when the decision
concerns an application to enter a school or to obtain social benefits.”); Sandra Wachter &
Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in
the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 494, 505–06 (“Automated decisionmaking, profiling, and related machine-learning techniques pose new opportunities for
privacy-invasive, discriminatory, and biased decision-making based on inferential
analytics.”).
59 GDPR, supra note 39, art. 22(1).
60 See id. recital 71; Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines, supra note 57, at 21–22.
61 GDPR, supra note 39, art. 22(2).
62 Id.
63 See Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 841, 863 (2018) (“[T]he GDPR does not appear to require opening the ‘black box’
to explain the internal logic of the decision-making system to data subjects.”).
64 Id. at 842.
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See GDPR, supra note 39, ch. VIII.
Id. art. 82.
67 See, e.g., id. art. 83 (setting forth administrative fines by type of violation); Lukas
Feiler, Takeaways from the First GDPR Fines, CYBERSPACE LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2018
(reporting on early three cases of actual fines imposed for data privacy breaches ranging
from 4,800 euros to 400,000 euros).
68 GDPR, supra note 39, art. 83(5).
69 See Henry Kenyon, U.S. Firms May Be Lacking in Cyber Insurance Coverage
Against GDPR Fines, CQ ROLL CALL, Sept. 21, 2018.
70 GDPR, supra note 39, art. 15.
71 Id. art. 89(1).
72 Id. art. 89(2).
73 Id. art. 89(1).
74 Id. art. 89.
66
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The rights and obligations in the GDPR are backed by potentially
substantial legal sanctions, including potentially hefty fines.65 Data
users also may sue for damages.66 The tariff of fines vary by type of
violation.67 At the high end, infringement of the basic legal conditions
for data processing, such as satisfying the conditions for obtaining consent, can result in “administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR
[approximately U.S. $23.5 million], or . . . up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is
higher.”68 The fines are so substantial that many U.S. companies,
accustomed to operating under a much more permissive balance of
business interests and privacy, lack sufficient coverage to pay if
sanctioned.69
Framing the rights of data subjects through the paramount lens of
individual privacy results in a focus on an individual’s control over
personal data, rather than the public’s interest in the aggregated personal data. The right of access, for example, is couched in terms of the
singular “data subject” with respect to one’s individual data, rather
than vested in all data subjects for a public interest purpose such as
scientific studies to improve health or safety.70 The concession to
public interest is mainly in the form of limited authorization to derogate from some of the privacy rights in the GDPR.71
Member states or the European Union may provide for derogations from the rights of access, rectification, restriction of processing,
and objection if they “are likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement” of processing for scientific or statistical purposes.72 The authorization to derogate is subject to safeguards such as
pseudonymization, to respect the principle of data minimization.73
Data minimization means ensuring that data collection, use, and
storage are limited to the amount necessary for the purposes
gathered.74
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The GDPR’s underdeveloped distinction between commercial
use of consumer data and nonprofit use for purposes such as
advancing public health have raised concerns among researchers
about potentially severe burdens.75 Private companies such as
Facebook have invoked the GDPR’s threat of multimillion dollar
sanctions as a reason not to share important data with researchers
addressing issues such as the transmission of misinformation.76 Ultimately, Facebook recently released one of the largest social science
databases ever assembled but with details obscured using differential
privacy techniques that perturb the data by introducing noise and censoring.77 These techniques render the ability to draw research conclusions complicated, problematic, and in the case of study of smaller
groups, impossible.78
Some obstacles to scientific research posed by the GDPR, such as
questions about the specificity of consent that data controllers must
obtain, have been ameliorated by later clarifications in recitals to the
GDPR.79 In 2020, the European Data Protection Supervisor noted the
vital role of researchers in a democracy and how privacy protections
can be used as cover for corporate secrecy to stymie data access.80
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75 See Edward S. Dove, David Townend & Bartha M. Knoppers, Data Protection and
Consent to Biomedical Research: A Step Forward?, 384 LANCET 855, 855 (2014) (noting
potentially significant burdens on large-scale research entities); Phillips & Knoppers, supra
note 45, at 107 (describing “a wave of unease in many data-intensive industries”).
76 See King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9 (“The greatest barrier we
have faced [in obtaining data from Facebook for social science research] concerned
Facebook’s interpretation of the relevant privacy restrictions contained in the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) . . . . They sometimes take the position that those
restrictions prevent researchers from analyzing individual level data, even if de-identified
or aggregated.”); see also EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, A PRELIMINARY OPINION ON
DATA PROTECTION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 2 (2020), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/
files/publication/20-01-06_opinion_research_en.pdf (“Researchers operating within ethical
governance frameworks should therefore be able to access necessary . . . data, with a valid
legal basis and subject to the principle of proportionality and appropriate safeguards.”).
77 See King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9; see also Fang Liu, A
Statistical Overview on Data Privacy, 34 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 477,
482–84 (2020) (discussing how differential privacy techniques generally operate); Michael
Hawes, Senior Advisor for Data Access & Priv. Rsch. & Methodology Directorate, U.S.
Census Bureau, American Statistical Association Webinar: Differential Privacy and the
2020 Decennial Census (Jan. 28, 2020), https://zenodo.org/record/4122103/files/
Privacy_webinar_1-28-2020.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) (discussing differential privacy
techniques in the context of highly protected U.S. Census data).
78 See King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9.
79 See Phillips & Knoppers, supra note 45, at 108 (describing the changes incorporated
in Recital 33 to the GDPR); Edward S. Dove, The EU General Data Protection Regulation:
Implications for International Scientific Research in the Digital Era, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
1013, 1013–15 (2018).
80 European Data Prot. Supervisor, A Preliminary Opinion on Data Protection and
Scientific Research, at 9 (Jan. 6, 2020), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/2001-06_opinion_research_en.pdf.
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Such clarifications and acknowledgments have quelled some of the
initial concerns, generating greater acceptance of the GDPR as “a
well-drafted piece of legislation that raises the standards of data protection globally.”81 But there remain difficulties in interpretation and
application because the GDPR’s “default lens tends to focus on relationships between private sector companies and their customers.”82
Researchers continue to express concerns that digital platforms are
limiting data access to mitigate the risk of liability, reducing
researchers to alternative data-scavenging strategies such as building
tools for unsanctioned data-scraping.83
The GDPR has been influential in setting standards for data protection beyond its territorial scope, as companies streamline operations across borders and nations wishing to do business in Europe
adopt equivalent protections.84 While the GDPR is a progressive—
some might argue aggressive—step in data protection law, its vision
remains limited by the frame of individual privacy rights and focus on
the relationship between consumers and private companies using data
for profitmaking ends. More work remains to be done in resolving
open questions and new frontiers in rights and vision. Moreover, a
prominent jurisdiction—the United States—has resisted falling in line
with the GDPR’s provisions, and is still searching for the right balance
of protections.85
B.

Consumer Data Privacy in the Wild West (United States)

81
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Dove, supra note 79, at 1013.
Phillips & Knoppers, supra note 45, at 108.
83 See ELIZABETH HANSEN SHAPIRO, MICHAEL SUGARMAN, FERNANDO BERMEJO &
ETHAN ZUCKERMAN, NETGAIN PARTNERSHIP, NEW APPROACHES TO PLATFORM DATA
RESEARCH 28–39 (2021), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1bPsMbaBXAROUYVesaN3dCtfaZpXZgI0x/view (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) (discussing
current strategies for data collection both with and without platform cooperation and the
problems associated with these methods).
84 See Clare Sullivan, GDPR Regulation of AI and Deep Learning in the Context of
IOT Data Processing—A Risky Strategy, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2018, at 1, 19.
85 See infra Section I.B; see also Sullivan, supra note 84, at 19 (identifying that the
United States is a notable exception to nations falling under the influence of GDPR
provisions).
86 See Jennifer Huddleston, Preserving Permissionless Innovation in Federal Data
Privacy Policy, J. INTERNET L., June 2019, at 1, 18 (“Sometimes critics allege that the
United States has been a ‘Wild West’ when it comes to data privacy and protection.”).
82
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Critics sometimes call the United States a “wild west” frontier
when it comes to personal data and privacy protection.86 In contrast to
the concerted supranational coordination in the European Union,
consumer data privacy protection in the United States is still a largely
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piecemeal patchwork.87 Federal legislation remains in germination.88
Depending on one’s perspective, the different approach in the United
States may be due to a greater focus on other important interests such
as innovation—or reflective of the “weak tradition of privacy” or
“weak or nonexistent privacy regime” in the United States.89
The nascent approach to comprehensive consumer data regulation is not for lack of interest. More than eighty percent of Americans
surveyed by the Pew Research Center reported they go online daily,
with most reporting they are either “almost constantly” online or
online “several times a day.”90 An even larger Pew survey found that
seventy-nine percent of Americans are concerned over how companies use their personal data.91 In recent years, numerous states have
considered consumer data privacy legislation.92 This Section describes
some key recent legislation and proposals that are important in spurring debate but remain largely limited in their focus on rights to one’s
individual data, rather than the public’s right of access to big data for
public interest purposes.
1.

States Lead on Data Privacy Laws

With one of the most populous consumer bases in the United
States, California took the lead in passing “the most far-reaching privacy measure ever to be enacted” in the nation.93 Enacted just one

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 44 Side A
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87 Id. (noting that California’s passage of a privacy protection law “potentially creat[es]
a state-level patchwork”).
88 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
89 Compare, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 370, 411 (2019) (describing critiques of America’s
“weak tradition” and “weak or nonexistent privacy regime”), with Huddleston, supra note
86, at 18 (explaining the problems with European-type strict privacy regulations on
innovation and preferring American openness toward innovation).
90 Andrew Perrin & Sara Atske, About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Say They Are ‘Almost
Constantly’ Online, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/03/26/about-three-in-ten-u-s-adults-say-they-are-almost-constantly-online.
Among the 1,502 Americans aged 18 or older surveyed in 2021, 79% were either “almost
constantly” or “several times a day” online. Id.; see also PEW RSCH. CTR., INTERNET
FREQUENCY UPDATE METHODOLOGY (2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/Internet-Frequency-Update-Methodology-Topline.pdf (reporting survey
size and methods for the study described in this footnote).
91 AUXIER ET AL., supra note 34. For information on the survey’s size, see American
Trends Survey Methodology, supra note 34 (reporting a total of 15,134 respondents after
the 2019 and 2020 waves of recruitment).
92 See 2020 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/2020-consumer-data-privacy-legislation637290470.aspx (summarizing for each
state consumer data privacy legislation that has been introduced and the outcome).
93 Grant Davis-Denny, Jordan Navarrette & Nefi Acosta, The California Consumer
Privacy Act: 3 Early Questions, LAW 360 (July 2, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1059403/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-3-early-questions.
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month after the GDPR entered into effect, the CCPA became operative in January 2020.94 The CCPA explicitly focuses on the relationship
between businesses and their consumers, whereas the GDPR is
couched in terms generally applicable to all data controllers, even
though its default paradigm is businesses’ use of consumer data for
commercial purposes.95 The CCPA has several similarities with its
wider-sweeping European counterpart in terms of the rights granted
to consumers over their personal data, and the regulation of entities
that may be outside the regulated jurisdiction if they also conduct business in the jurisdiction.96
Both the CCPA and GDPR contain bills of rights for consumers.97 Similar to the data subject rights in the GDPR, the CCPA
gives consumers rights of information, access, and control over personal data.98 Consumers have the right to know, upon request, what
personal information businesses collect about them; the sources, uses,
and purposes of the information; and what third parties have received
the information.99
In some respects, the CCPA gives consumers even greater control
over their personal information. Rather than just the right of rectification of incorrect information, the CCPA gives consumers the right to
request that the business delete any information the business has
about the consumer.100 The CCPA also gives consumers an “opt-out”
right to direct businesses that sell personal information not to sell personal information about that consumer, on request.101 Consumers are
protected from discriminatory business practices, such as charging dif-

11/18/2021 14:12:20

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West 2021).
See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
96 See Joanna Kessler, Note, Data Protection in the Wake of the GDPR: California’s
Solution for Protecting “The World’s Most Valuable Resource,” 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 99,
111–12 (2019) (describing parallels between the CCPA and the GDPR); Michael R.
Overly, Is California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 Going to Be GDPR Version 2?,
NAT’L L. REV., Sept. 6, 2018 (noting that the CCPA’s scope is more akin to the GDPR
than to traditional privacy statutes in the United States); see also GDPR, supra note 39,
art. 3(2) (noting that under certain circumstances, “[t]his Regulation applies to the
processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or
processor not established in the Union”); CIV. § 1798.140(c)(1) (defining a regulated
business as one “that does business in the State of California”).
97 Compare GDPR, supra note 39, ch. III (listing rights of the data subject), with CIV.
§ 1798.150 (enumerating consumer rights and protections).
98 CIV. §§ 1798.100–.145; see also supra text accompanying notes 47–64 (outlining the
rights in the GDPR).
99 CIV. §§ 1798.100, 1798.110, 1798.115.
100 Id. § 1798.105.
101 Id. § 1798.120.
95
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102 Id. § 1798.125. While consumers may not be punished for exercising their rights,
businesses may offer incentives for sharing personal information, such as offering different
prices or levels of service based on the value of personal information received. Id.
§ 1798.125(2)(b)(1).
103 Id. § 1798.140(s).
104 Id.
105 Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., id. § 1798.140(c) (defining business as “[a] sole
proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other
legal entity that is organized or operated for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders
or other owners . . . and that satisfies one or more of the following thresholds” on gross
revenue, or volume of personal information dealt, or proportion of annual revenue derived
from selling personal information (emphasis added)).
106 This interpretation is further suggested by the explicit exclusion of health care
providers, protected health information, medical data, and information collected as part of
a clinical trial from the scope of the CCPA. See id. § 1798.145(c)(1).
107 See GDPR, supra note 39, ch. IV (requiring “[d]ata protection by design” through
privacy impact assessments and numerous other obligations imposed on data controllers).
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ferent prices or offering different levels of services, based on the exercise of their consumer rights under the CCPA.102
The CCPA makes some provision for the use of consumer data
research, defined as “scientific, systematic study and observation,
including basic research or applied research that is in the public
interest and that adheres to all other applicable ethics and privacy
laws or studies conducted in the public interest in the area of public
health.”103 The requirements for research are stringent. The CCPA
requires that the data be anonymized, thoroughly protected against
the possibility of intentional or inadvertent consumer reidentification,
and used exclusively for noncommercial and limited research
purposes.104
Further, the data must be “[s]ubjected by the business conducting
the research to additional security controls that limit access to the
research data to only those individuals in a business as are necessary
to carry out the research purpose,” suggesting that the CCPA contemplated regulation of for-profit businesses such as pharmaceutical companies which use consumer data.105 Apparently omitted from the
scope of the CCPA’s consideration is the grant of access to consumer
data by businesses to nonprofit entities for public interest research.106
While the CCPA notably and unusually (for an American law)
emulates a more European-type model of a declaration of individual
privacy rights, the CCPA is overall less comprehensive and burdensome for data gatherers than the GDPR, and its fines are less severe.
The CCPA does not impose the extensive list of obligations on data
controllers that is set forth in the GDPR.107 In contrast to the potentially multimillion dollar administrative fines for some types of violations under the GDPR, the CCPA provides for:
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[A]n injunction and liab[ility] for a civil penalty of not more than
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation or
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for each intentional
violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action
brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the
Attorney General.108

Civil suits brought by consumers are authorized for data
breaches, but damages are capped at no more than $750 per incident.109 Also notably, unlike the GDPR, the CCPA does not tackle
the thorny issue of automated decisionmaking and profiling facilitated
by the amassing of big data.110
Among the many states to consider data privacy legislation after
California’s new law, Maine and Nevada succeeded in passing consumer data privacy legislation in 2019.111 Both pieces of legislation are
more modest than the CCPA. Maine’s new law only applies to broadband internet providers and requires the providers to keep customer
data secure and obtain explicit consumer consent before using, disclosing, selling, or providing access to the customer’s personal information unless an exception applies.112 Nevada’s law requires
operators of online services or internet websites to give Nevada consumers the ability to request that their information not be sold for
money.113
Other major-market states, including Massachusetts, New York,
and Washington, have considered consumer data privacy legislation in
the wake of the CCPA, but thus far the proposals have not passed.114
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 45 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

108 CIV. § 1798.155. Fines of $2,500 (or even $750, which is the cap for civil suits brought
by consumers) per violation adds up very quickly if a company’s actions have affected a
large number of users. See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement at 12, In re Hanna Andersson & Salesforce.com Data
Breach Litig., No. 20-cv-00812 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2020), ECF No. 68 (preliminarily
approving a $400,000 settlement in a consumer class action brought under the CCPA).
109 CIV. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
110 For a discussion of the GDPR’s provisions on automated decisionmaking and
profiling, see supra text accompanying notes 57–64.
111 ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 9301 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A (2021); see also Lothar
Determann & Helena J. Engfeldt, Maine and Nevada’s New Data Privacy Laws and the
California Consumer Privacy Act Compared, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 20, 2019), https://
www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/06/maine-and-nevada-new-dataprivacy-laws (comparing the three new state laws).
112 See tit. 35-A, § 9301(3)–(4) (enumerating exceptions from statutory coverage).
113 REV. § 603A.345.
114 See, e.g., Khari Johnson, Washington Privacy Act Fails Again, but State Legislature
Passes Facial Recognition Regulation, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 12, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://
venturebeat.com/2020/03/12/washington-privacy-act-fails-in-state-legislature-again
(reporting the failure of proposed data privacy legislation in Washington); Peter J. Guffin,
Donald R. Frederico & Melanie A. Conroy, State Legislature Hears Concerns About
Proposed Massachusetts Consumer Data Privacy Bill, NAT’L L. REV., Oct. 11, 2019
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California’s recent law remains the most sweeping American effort to
protect consumer data privacy.115 While an ambitious start for U.S.
consumer privacy law, the CCPA’s prime focuses remain the
consumer-business relationship and rights to one’s personal data,
rather than public access to pooled data for public interest purposes
such as research by nonprofit entities.116
2.

Congressional Debates and Proposals

Crafting comprehensive consumer data privacy legislation at the
federal level is even more challenging in a nation with varying cultural
views regarding privacy, free commerce, government regulation, protection for the vulnerable, and individual rights.117 Amid concerns
over a patchwork of state consumer data privacy laws and recurring
controversies over how companies use and protect personal data,
there is strong interest within Congress to address these concerns, but
a lack of consensus on how to resolve key issues.118 Congress has contemplated various proposals regarding consumer rights, regulatory
burdens on businesses, remedies for violations, and other key legal

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 46 Side A
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(describing substantial opposition to a proposed data privacy bill in Massachusetts);
Jeewon Kim Serrato & Susan Ross, Nevada, New York and Other States
Follow California’s CCPA, DATA PROT. REP. (June 6, 2019), https://
www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/06/nevada-new-york-and-other-states-followcalifornias-ccpa (describing proposed New York legislation similar to the CCPA).
115 See supra text accompanying notes 93–96.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 95–106.
117 See, e.g., Sophie Cockcroft & Saphira Rekker, The Relationship Between Culture and
Information Privacy Policy, 26 ELEC. MKTS. 55, 65–70 (2015) (analyzing cultural predictors
of the level of privacy legislation in national jurisdictions); Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman &
Nicholas Christakis, The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy Settings
in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 79, 93–94 (2008)
(discussing differing cultural preferences, of which a “taste for privacy” is only part of the
influences, even among the relatively more homogenous group of U.S. students at a private
college).
118 See, e.g., GDPR & CCPA: Opt-Ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on
Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(2019) (discussing bipartisan and industry interest in crafting federal data privacy
legislation but splitting on approaches); Mabel Crescioni & Tara Sklar, The Research
Exemption Carve Out: Understanding Research Participants Rights Under GDPR and U.S.
Data Privacy Laws, 60 JURIMETRICS 125, 135–36 (2020) (discussing differences in
approaches that render federal legislation difficult).
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119 See Huddleston, supra note 86, at 18. See generally JENNIFER HUDDLESTON,
MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV., POLICY BRIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION PROPOSALS (2019), https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/huddleston_-_policy_brief_-_an_analysis_of_recent_federal_data_privacy_
policy_proposals_-_v1.pdf (offering an overview of federal consumer data privacy
proposals in the 115th and 116th Congresses).
120 See Huddleston, supra note 86, at 18–19.
121 Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S.2637, 116th Cong. (2019).
122 Id.
123 Id. §§ 5, 7.
124 Id. § 3.
125 Di Ai, Sen. Wyden Introduces Federal Data Privacy Bill, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (Oct.
30, 2019), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/sen-wyden-introduces-federal-data-privacy-bill
(discussing the legislation).
126 See Press Release, Off. of Sen. Brian Schatz, Schatz Leads Group of 16 Senators in
Reintroducing Legislation to Help Protect People’s Personal Data Online (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-leads-group-of-16-senators-inreintroducing-legislation-to-help-protect-peoples-personal-data-online.
127 See Data Care Act of 2019, S.2961, 116th Cong. §§ 2(d)–(e), 4 (2019).
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issues.119 None thus far have made significant progress toward
passage.120
Among the toughest federal contenders is the Mind Your Own
Business Act of 2019, legislation introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, a
Democrat from Oregon.121 Spurred by data breach controversies, the
legislation has similarly severe financial penalties like the GDPR and
targets large companies as defined by gross revenues.122 The legislation imposes numerous requirements on large businesses, including
“automated decision system impact assessments” and “data protection
impact assessments” and further authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission to impose more regulations.123 The bill would also
expand the definition of substantial injuries from data breaches to
include noneconomic injuries.124 Commentators view the proposed
legislation as unlikely to pass in its current form.125
Two other federal proposals take different approaches to equalizing the odd imbalance in responsibilities between commercial entities profiting from personal data and professionals such as doctors,
lawyers, and researchers entrusted with personal information. The
idea behind the proposed Data Care Act is to impose duties of care,
loyalty, and confidentiality on online companies analogous to the
duties doctors, lawyers, and bankers must exercise regarding their clients’ information.126 In addition to imposing fiduciary duties, the legislation would empower the Federal Trade Commission to interpret
the scope and applicability of the duties and enforce them.127
A second piece of legislation, introduced in Congress by a bipartisan coalition, extends disclosure and review board requirements to
“[a]ny large online operator that engages in any form of behavioral or
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psychological research based on the activity or data of its users.”128
This proposal addresses an odd imbalance in our present status quo:
Private profit-driven entities have fewer hurdles to using consumer big
data to research how to manipulate consumer behavior than nonprofit
researchers generating knowledge to benefit the public.129 Nonprofit
academic researchers typically receive federal funds or are at institutions receiving federal funds, and thus are subject to regulations and
ethical traditions requiring informed consent and institutional review
board approval.130 Private commercial entities seeking strategies to
enhance profits using internally acquired data are not subject to these
elaborate external review processes and protections.131 Businesses
conducting research on consumers also do not have to follow the
public beneficence principle that typically guides institutional review
board regulation of proposed research.132
A seemingly alluring approach to remedy this gap is to extend
informed consent and institutional review boards to major commercial
entities studying consumer manipulation. Adding disclosure and
review board requirements has the surface appeal of equalizing the
requirements between scientists and commercial entities. Notice-type
laws also appeal to regulators because they seem cheaper and easier
to enforce, appear to be less heavy-handed than command-and-
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128 Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S.1084, 116th Cong. § 3(b)
(2019).
129 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l) (2020) (defining research for which institutional
review board review is required as “a systematic investigation . . . designed to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge”). Studies illuminating how to reduce the incidence
of disease and death contribute to generalizable knowledge; how to get you to buy more
does not.
130 See, e.g., id. § 46.101(a) (explaining that institutional review board regulations
“appl[y] to all research involving human subjects conducted, supported, or otherwise
subject to regulation by any Federal department or agency that takes appropriate
administrative action to make the policy applicable to such research”).
131 See Press Release, Off. of Sen. Mark Warner, Senators Introduce Bipartisan
Legislation to Ban Manipulative ‘Dark Patterns’ (Apr. 9, 2019), https://
www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/4/senators-introduce-bipartisan-legislationto-ban-manipulative-dark-patterns.
132 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE MENLO REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES GUIDING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 9
(2012), https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/menlo_report_actual_formatted/
menlo_report_actual_formatted.pdf (explaining that the fundamental principle of
beneficence undergirding institutional review board of research calls for maximizing the
benefits while minimizing the harm to human subjects); NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF
HUM. SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., &
WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/thebelmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter T HE BELMONT REPORT] (prescribing
adherence to the principle of beneficence).
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control regulations, and seem to legitimate what occurs after notice
and consent.133
Yet there is a growing body of literature on the fictive utility of
the disclosure-and-consent model, particularly in the electronic age
where people click impatiently past the verbiage to get to the reward
of the service or good sought.134 Moreover, informed consent tackles
just one facet of the challenge of regulating access to, and use of,
pooled personal data and leaves larger underlying questions
unresolved. There is a need to advance beyond the allure of extending
informed consent and review board-type regulations and address
overarching, unresolved questions about how our pooled personal
data should be owned, controlled, accessed, and used.
On May 20, 2021, Massachusetts Congresswoman Lori Trahan
introduced legislation that makes an early foray towards facilitating
data-sharing by private companies, albeit limited in focus to targeted
advertising data held by the world’s largest companies.135 The legislation is aimed at greater transparency surrounding targeted advertising
on the world’s most massive and powerful digital platforms, such as
Google and Facebook.136 Currently titled the U.S. Social Media
Disclosure and Transparency of Advertisements Act, the proposed
legislation would require platforms with more than 100 million
monthly active users to share targeted advertisement data with academic researchers working with higher educational institutions.137
While specific in its focus and aims to concerns over nontransparent
and potentially problematic targeted advertising, the legislation shows
the openness of lawmakers to fresh solutions that involve data
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 47 Side B
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133 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2012).
134 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online
Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (2016) (describing digital contracts as
“increasingly the subject of satire”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of
Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1764–65 (2014) (discussing the perception
that expecting consumers to read long contracts is unreasonable); Victoria C. Plaut &
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of NonReadership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 305–06 (2012)
(noting that nonreadership of digital contracts may stem from perceptions that such
contracts are all alike, do not offer any real choice, and are largely irrelevant); Omri BenShahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647,
665–729 (2011) (discussing generally the deficiencies of mandated disclosure regimes).
135 Press Release, Rep. Lori Trahan, Trahan Leads Introduction of Social Media DATA
Transparency Legislation (May 20, 2021), https://trahan.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2112 (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
136 Id.
137 Social Media Disclosure and Transparency of Advertisements Act of 2021 (Social
Media DATA Act), H.R. 3451, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/
hr3451/BILLS-117hr3451ih.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
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sharing. The proposal also is noteworthy in moving beyond the predominant privacy paradigm.
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AUXIER ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
Id.
140 See, e.g., Birkin, supra note 26, at 251 (discussing private ownership of important
consumer data and the three main bases for granting access).
141 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2055, 2069–72 (2004) (discussing the commodification and trading of personal data);
Julia Alpert Gladstone, Data Mines and Battlefields: Looking at Financial Aggregators to
Understand the Legal Boundaries and Ownership Rights in the Use of Personal Data, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 313, 329 (2001) (discussing how consumer profiles and
databases are “a critical strategy to successful business” and “valuable intangible asset”);
Jessica Littman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1284–86 (2000) (discussing the creation of digital profiles from our online behaviors and
packaging of the personal information for sale).
142 There is a massive literature on John Locke’s theory of appropriation. For a
discussion, see, for example, Karl Widerquist, Lockean Theories of Property: Justifications
for Unilateral Appropriation, 2 PUB. REASON 3, 5–15 (2010) (discussing interpretations of
Lockean appropriation theory and critiques of it); Herman T. Tavani, Locke, Intellectual
Property Rights, and the Information Commons, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 87, 88–93 (2005)
139
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While many current legislative proposals focus on data privacy,
there is much more to the story and to consumer concern over data
collection by companies. A recent large-sample Pew Research Center
survey found that 81% of Americans believe that the risks of data
collection by companies outweigh the benefits.138 Relatedly, 72% of
Americans believe they personally benefit little to none from the personal data that companies gather on them.139 Beyond privacy, an
overarching concern is that while consumers bear the costs of data
aggregation, they do not share in the benefits.
The concern is compounded by an imbalance in access to the valuable pooled data held by commercial entities for public-sector or
nonprofit academic researchers. Absent legislative intervention, which
remains nascent, access to potentially valuable data depends on
whether a business wishes to grant it because of a shared interest, or
perhaps a vision of corporate social responsibility.140 Without a clear
theoretical and legal framework for property rights in shared data,
currently the companies that collect and control the data enjoy
ownership-like rights of use and profits in the lucrative information,
including the rights of potential exploitation, sale, and resale.141
The result is a modern form of “might makes right” mixed with
the Lockean notion that the entity that appropriates a resource gets to
own it.142 As senior business executives acknowledge, “[t]hough some
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companies are open about their data practices, most prefer to keep
consumers in the dark, choose control over sharing, and ask for forgiveness rather than permission.”143 The murk surrounding property
rights in our personal data is a major unaddressed part of the discontent surrounding data use, control, and access. This Part tackles the
property issues and makes the case for recognizing a right of the
public to benefit from the big data amassed from us.
A.

Property Approaches to Pooled Personal Data

In the heady early days of the Internet, prominent scholars proposed that the law vest property rights over personal data in the individual user, creating a market in which privacy rights and tradeoffs
could be negotiated and crystallize.144 The hope was that the invisible
hand of the market would move via consumer choice toward the right
balance of protections as consumers chose to visit businesses that
advertised acceptable terms and policies.145 The problem was that
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(discussing the applicability of Lockean property theories to the information commons
context); Jeremy Waldron, Locke, Tully, and the Regulation of Property, 32 POL. STUD. 98,
99–105 (1984) (construing Locke’s argument about the natural property rights of
individuals in a society).
143 Morey et al., supra note 37.
144 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 123–34,
160–62 (1999) (arguing that cyberspace and the use of personal data can be regulated);
Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC. RES. 247, 261 (2002) (arguing that using
traditional property rhetoric along with its associated moral rights to understand and argue
for privacy would enhance privacy protections); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63 (1999) (“So the trick is to construct a regime
where those who would use the data internalize this [information] cost, by paying those
whose data are used.”); Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of
Personal Data in the Global Information Economy, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 769–73 (1999)
(discussing the feasibility of establishing an individual property right to personal data);
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1246–49 (1998) (analyzing the efficacy of a market solution to information privacy
invasions); Kenneth C. Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Market and Privacy:
Mechanics of Pricing Information, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
COM. (June 12, 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy
(arguing that the lack of individual property rights over personal data has led to a personal
information market failure).
145 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in
the Protection of Personal Information, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T
COM. (June 12, 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy
(discussing how consumer preferences influence privacy policies under a market selfregulation model); Steven A. Bibas, Writing Competition Winner, A Contractual Approach
to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 605 (1994) (“In the case of regulation of
the information industry, perceptions and valuations of the privacy problem vary too
greatly for a conventional, centralized solution to fit well. We must therefore turn to the
branch of the common law most sensitive to individual preferences: contracts.”). The idea
of creating property rights in one’s personal information as a strategy to protect against
harms from appropriation of our information predates the big data era. See, e.g., ALAN F.
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people soon lost control over their personal data from their online
browsing and took to clicking past shrink-wrap notices.146 Experience
also shows people are not sophisticated comparison shoppers among
privacy policies.147
Individual privacy-oriented theories of property rights in personal
data also do not address property rights in the most valuable, powerful commodity today—our pooled data. The personal data droplets
we leave in our everyday Internet traverses accumulate into valuable
pools of information at the individual and group level.148 The volume
and value of personal data are growing exponentially with the
advance of the Internet of Things and alluring devices that collect not
just identities, financial information, and contact information but also
biometric and health data such as facial and fingerprint scans, sleep
patterns, fitness indicators, biochemical blood data, disease markers,
and more.149
1.

Property by Capture: Intellectual Property Protections for
Compiled Data

In the absence of clear laws regarding property rights in our personal data, the bundles of rights associated with ownership in our consumer big data are held by the companies that collect and control the
information.150 Consumer data are typically lucrative, privately controlled assets to be used and potentially sold for profit by the compa-
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WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 323 (1968) (“[P]ersonal information, thought of as the
right of decision over one’s private personality, should be defined as a property right, with
all the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process
guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful in devising.”). But see ARTHUR R.
MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 211–12
(1971) (“[R]eal and personal property concepts are irrelevant to the personal values that
we are attempting to preserve by recognizing a right of privacy.”).
146 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View
from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000) (“We are used to
relinquishing control over bits of personal information in many seemingly unrelated
contexts.”).
147 See, e.g., Littman, supra note 141, at 1287 (“Self-regulation is an abject failure . . . .”);
Netanel, supra note 146, at 476 (“Internet users awash in an overabundance of information
are no more able to assess and compare products and rule regimes than are their offline
counterparts.”).
148 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 13–22 (2004) (discussing the accumulation of our personal
information via the digital trails we leave); Netanel, supra note 146, at 476–77 (noting that
accumulation of many “innocuous isolated instances of data collection, spread out over a
considerable period,” can be “aggregated and compiled into a highly pervasive profile”).
149 Elvy, supra note 5, at 426–27.
150 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 141, at 2056–57 (explaining that companies view
personal data “as a corporate asset and have invested heavily in software that facilitates
the collection of consumer information”).
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nies that provide the enticement and infrastructure for our online
interactions.151 Professor Edward Janger argues that the murky state
of property rights and privacy protections in our personal information
has led to a tragedy of the commons in which data are available for
the taking, leading to overuse and misuse harms.152 Yet the state of
access and control to our pooled personal data today is hardly a commons available to all. Property rights to our pooled personal data have
arisen through capture and possession—a “natural expedient” default
allocation of entitlements, in the words of philosopher David Hume,
writing in the 1700s.153
Applying principles of copyright and trade secret law, courts have
recognized property rights in the consumer information that companies compile.154 The Constitution authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings”—what we term copyright protection today.155 Under the
Copyright Act, “original works of authorship” are accorded intellectual property protection.156 To be protectible as “original,” a work
must be “independently created by the author” and have “at least
some minimal degree of creativity.”157 Facts such as someone’s name,
address, and contact information are not copyrightable.158 A compilation or collection of facts, however, can be deemed sufficiently orig151

Nguyen, supra note 5, at 564–67; see also, e.g., Gladstone, supra note 141, at 329.
Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 899, 911 (2003).
153 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 503 (Lewis Amherst SelbyBigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (observing that an inevitable problem a
developing society will face is how to separate possessions: “This difficulty will not detain
them long; but it must immediately occur, as the most natural expedient, that everyone
continues to enjoy what he is at present master of, and that property or constant possession
be conjoin’d to the immediate possession”); see also ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS
OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION AND WELFARE 93–99 (2004) (noting the theoretical and
philosophical roots of recognition of property rights by possession).
154 See, e.g., Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs., Inc., 893 F.3d 1176,
1179–80, 1186 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing copyright protections for Experian’s
compilation of consumer data); In re Nw. Airlines Priv. Litig., No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL
1278459, at *4 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (holding that the compilation of passenger data into
a record by Northwest Airlines is the company’s property); Mason v. Montgomery Data,
Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136, 140–41 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a compilation of real estate
ownership data superimposed on maps was protectible because the compiler made
independent choices “to select information from numerous and sometimes conflicting
sources” such as various public records and combined the data onto “an effective pictorial
expression”).
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
156 17 U.S.C. § 102(c).
157 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (establishing that
information alone, without a degree of original creativity, is not protectable by copyright).
158 Id. at 361.
152
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159 See 17 U.S.C. § 103; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 347–48 (explaining that facts are “part
of the public domain, available to every person” but “[f]actual compilations, on the other
hand, may possess the requisite originality [to be copyrightable]” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369–70 (5th Cir. July
1981))).
160 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362–63; 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
161 Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs., Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 1179–80,
1186 (9th Cir. 2008).
162 Id. at 1180.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1185.
166 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (explaining that
information must be kept secret to receive protection).
167 See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
§§ 1.03, 1.07A (2021).
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inal to receive copyright protection.159 What is protected is the
contribution by the author in selecting, compiling, or arranging the
data—and that contribution must be more creative than just arranging
names and phone numbers of all people in a service area
alphabetically.160
For example, the Ninth Circuit extended copyright protections to
a database of consumer personal information compiled by Experian
and sold to commercial clients wanting to expand their marketing
reach.161 Experian’s ConsumerView database had more than 250 million consumer records containing hundreds of datapoints about each
consumer, such as purchasing habits, earnings, and behavior predictions, compiled from 2,200 public and proprietary sources of information.162 The Ninth Circuit noted that Experian tested the data quality
of each source of information and selected name and address pairings
that the company believed would be valuable to clients wishing to
purchase the compiled personal data, excluding the information of
prisoners or the very elderly.163 The company also deployed
thousands of “business rules” or algorithms to resolve conflicts
between sources and determine the information to include in the
database.164 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the company’s culling of data
from multiple sources, sorting through conflicts, and exercising judgment about what data to include and exclude constituted independent
choices that “more than m[et] that standard” of creativity for copyright protection.165
Another source of property-like protections for collections of
consumer personal data is trade secret law—if the company protects
against public disclosure.166 Information kept secret that has independent economic value is accorded trade secret protection.167 Information can be considered a trade secret if: (1) it confers competitive
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advantage or has value derived from exclusive possession, (2) a company takes reasonable means to keep it secret, and (3) it is not publicly available.168 Traditional examples of protected trade secrets are
the formula for Coca Cola Classic or the recipe of the eleven herbs
and spices that flavor Kentucky Fried Chicken.169 Experian’s
ConsumerView database of personal information also offers an
example of trade secret protection in the context of commercializing
consumer personal information. The Ninth Circuit held that Experian
made a prima facie showing that its ConsumerView database also was
protected under trade secret law because the company maintained the
secrecy of the database.170 While Experian sold access to the database
to other entities, the access was granted under “strict security agreements with licensees to maintain the database’s secrecy.”171 Thus,
trade secret law rewards the efforts of companies to keep tight control
over the personal data collected through property protections.
2.

Beyond Ownership by Capture and Personal Data as Ferae
Naturae

11/18/2021 14:12:20

168 David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 145 (2007) (arguing against trade secret protections for
public infrastructure).
169 David R. Hannah, Keeping Trade Secrets Secret, 47 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 17, 17
(2006).
170 Experian, 894 F.3d at 1188.
171 Id.
172 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 403 (2003) (“Currently, neither property nor
torts theory recognizes individuals’ rights in their information.”).
173 Id. at 403; Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
174 Pierson, 3 Cai. at 175.
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Currently, property law does not recognize individual ownership
rights in one’s personal data; rather property rights attach when labor
is mixed with the data in a collection effort.172 As Professor Vera
Bergelson has observed, personal data in America is treated akin to
wild animals or other unowned resources free for the bagging, reminiscent of the famous case of Pierson v. Post.173 Pierson famously
expounded that wild animals, termed ferae naturae, such as the fox
pursued by hunters in the case, are up for grabs until someone takes
possession by mortally wounding or seizing them.174 In our modern
times, the personal data that teem in the wilds of our online traverses
are akin to the ferae naturae of old, lacking property protections until
a company collects and aggregates them into a valuable commodity.
Proposing a hybrid model of propertized personal data, Professor
Paul Schwartz noted that property is “a bundle of interests rather than
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despotic dominion over a thing.”175 Under Schwartz’s proposal,
people would have the right to transfer their data to businesses, but
further transfers such as resale of data are forbidden absent an opt-in
from the individual.176 Schwartz’s proposal has such enduring practical and theoretical appeal that nearly a decade later, a former
Facebook public policy director turned senior legislative counsel for
the ACLU endorsed the idea as a vision for where the law should
go.177
The current conventions on ownership of our data have arisen
because of the lack of clear law regarding property rights in our personal data. As a result, some of the most cutting-edge questions of our
times are relegated to remarkably primitive expedient defaults such as
possession being nine-tenths of the law.178 The property-like protections in our data that courts do recognize are squeezed into legal doctrines fashioned for simpler kinds of property with less far-reaching
public interest as well as private ramifications. It does not have to be
this way. The fomenting debate trying to address public concerns over
how personal data are controlled and used presents an opportunity to
also address root problems in the distribution of rights to benefit from
our pooled personal information.
B.

Toward a Public Right to Benefit from Our Pooled Data

175

11/18/2021 14:12:20

Schwartz, supra note 141, at 2094.
Id. at 2095–106.
177 See Timothy D. Sparapani, Putting Consumers at the Heart of the Social Media
Revolution: Toward a Personal Property Interest to Protect Privacy, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1309,
1313 (2012) (“[Schwartz] advocated for what he termed a ‘use-transfer restriction’
regarding personal data, and I endorse that limitation.”).
178 For a discussion of the intellectual origins of the old adage, see Carol M. Rose, The
Law Is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its Head, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF POSSESSION 40 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2015).
179 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
176
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The current debates around property protections for our personal
data has a gap between frames. The debate about property protections for personal data, usually spurred by concerns over privacy
harms, focuses on an individual’s ownership of personal data points—
just drops in the vast ocean of big data. Judicially accorded property
protections for compilations of data focus on the data collector’s
rights, not the rights of the public whose data is compiled into a valuable commodity. Missing is consideration of the public’s rights in our
pooled data.
The odd state of affairs is illustrated by application to the metaphor of the Stone Soup at the outset of the Article.179 Under the current approach to our pooled data, the exclusive control to enjoy the
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Stone Soup would be held by the travelers who provided the pot and
enticed the villagers out with their contributions. Moreover, the travelers may not share the soup with the villagers whose contributions
comprise the soup if they want to keep their rights. The incentive to
maintain exclusive control of powerful pooled data for revenueenhancing purposes is intensified by trade secret law, which only protects information that a company succeeds in keeping secret and out
of the public domain.180
Recognizing a right of the public to benefit does not mean
releasing a company’s valuable commodity into the public domain.
Nor does it mean vitiating privacy protections and data security safeguards. Rather, it means carving out provisions for public-interest
access and safe harbors that facilitate data sharing with parties qualified and trained to protect the data and carry out research that creates
public benefits such as improving health or safety. Such sharing is in
the interest of businesses as well as the community to improve public
perceptions and build trust regarding how personal data are being
used.181 It also represents a more just and equitable allocation of
property interests in our pooled personal data—and the power that
access to the information confers.182
1.

Access for Public Benefit Purposes

The consumer data that businesses use to target advertising,
expand sales, and encourage spending also could be productively
deployed for public benefit, to prevent outbreaks of disease, trace and
address the spread of false and dangerous claims, and more.183 For
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 51 Side B
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180 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“Once the data
that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those
data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.”).
181 See, e.g., Morey et al., supra note 37 (arguing that gaining customers’ confidence will
be key in the developing consumer-data space, as “[c]ompanies that are transparent about
the information they gather, give customers control of their personal data, and offer fair
value in return for it will be trusted and will earn ongoing and even expanded access”).
182 See, e.g., Alessandro Mantelero, Social Control, Transparency, and Participation in
the Big Data World, 17 J. INTERNET L. 23, 25–26 (2014) (discussing the need to “limit the
power over information and obtain a better allocation of it,” “in order to limit possible
abuse and illegitimate advantages [and] . . . . increase access to information[,] . . . spreading
the informational power currently in the hands of a few bodies”).
183 See, e.g., Jeremy Ginsberg, Matthew H. Mohebbi, Rajan S. Patel, Lynnette Brammer,
Mark S. Smolinski & Larry Brilliant, Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine
Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1012–14 (2009) (presenting a method to track the spread of
influenza-like illness using high volumes of Google search query data); Anti-Racism
Protests: Divisive Disinformation Narratives Go Viral on Facebook, Racking Up Over 26
Million Estimated Views, AVAAZ (June 12, 2020), https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/
anti_protest_disinformation (reporting on the spread of misinformation about protests
over race and policing using Facebook data).

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 52 Side A

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU502.txt

November 2021]

unknown

Seq: 34

RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM BIG DATA

15-NOV-21

16:55

1471

example, the granular user location data that Google deploys for
targeted advertising, product development, and other commercial
strategies also can be used to evaluate the success of public health
campaigns to encourage social distancing and limit travel to curb the
COVID-19 pandemic.184 Amassed cell phone location data also can
be used to evaluate compliance with COVID-19 reduction measures
restricting travel and social gatherings.185 Google search query data
have also created new ways to track the spread of influenza and detect
epidemics.186 Data released by Facebook have been used by a
watchdog group to study the spread of false information about vaccines and other health facts and to identify some of the major sources
of the spread of misinformation imperiling health.187 With the
proliferation of more online services and devices in the Internet of
Things, the volume of data and possibilities for public interest
research also will continue to exponentially expand.188
Currently, access for external researchers to privately held consumer data is a matter of voluntary grace by private companies—
motivated by anticipated benefits to the company, philanthropy, and
perhaps a sense of social responsibility.189 While some companies
have become more progressive about voluntarily sharing data, valuable consumer big data too often remains locked away for private
profitmaking, its public interest potential unrealized.190 Attempts by
researchers to access privately held big datasets and their vast poten-
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184 Natasha Lomas, Google Is Now Publishing Coronavirus Mobility Reports, Feeding
Off Users’ Location History, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2020, 9:19 AM), https://
techcrunch.com/2020/04/03/google-is-now-publishing-coronavirus-mobility-reportsfeeding-off-users-location-history.
185 See Nigel Chiwaya, Analysis: Data from 15 Million Phones Shows Some Americans
Are Gathering at Pre-Pandemic Levels, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2020, 6:31 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/analysis-data-15m-phones-shows-some-americans-aregathering-pre-n1229636.
186 See Ginsberg et al., supra note 183, at 1012–14.
187 See Facebook’s Algorithm: A Major Threat to Public Health, AVAAZ (Aug. 19,
2020), https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/facebook_threat_health.pdf; see also Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Misinformation About the Coronavirus Is Thwarting Facebook’s Best Efforts to
Catch It, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2020, 6:00 AM) (reporting on the “left-leaning” group
AVAAZ’s study using Facebook’s released data about the spread of health misinformation
during the COVID-19 pandemic).
188 See, e.g., Sylvia Zhang, Who Owns the Data Generated by Your Smart Car?, 32
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 299–300 (2018) (discussing new opportunities to study ways to
improve traffic safety and our public infrastructure using autonomous vehicle data).
189 See, e.g., L ESLIE H ARRIS & C HINMAYI S HARMA , F UTURE OF P RIV . F.,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE DATA SHARING DECISIONS 7–8 (2017), https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/FPF_Data_Sharing_Report_FINAL.pdf (examining the reasons
why companies share data with researchers); Birkin, supra note 26, at 251 (summarizing
the primary reasons why companies share data with researchers).
190 See Birkin, supra note 26, at 251.
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191 See Gary King & Nathaniel Persily, A New Model for Industry-Academic
Partnerships, 53 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 703 (2020) [hereinafter King & Persily, A New
Model].
192 HARRIS & SHARMA, supra note 189, at 1.
193 Id. at 4.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 4 (discussing lengthy trust-building required to woo companies into sharing
data).
196 See, e.g., Matt Stempeck, Sharing Data Is a Form of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV.
BUS. REV. (July 24, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/sharing-data-is-a-form-of-corporatephilanthropy (noting the “earned media opportunities, free labor represented by
academics’ brains, and the potential to hire the valuable talent that can emerge from such
partnerships”).
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tial often founder on proprietary barriers, trade secret concerns, and
the shoals of consumer privacy laws, which, as discussed in Part I, are
usually framed with business uses of the data as the paradigmatic
concern.191
As a Future of Privacy Forum study reports, “[m]ost corporate
data is typically unavailable to academic researchers.”192 Numerous
academic researchers interviewed in the exploratory study “expressed
concern about the unavailability of corporate data in any form.”193
Moreover, as companies accelerate in amassing valuable data,
“researchers also expressed concern that companies rather than social
scientists will increasingly set the research agenda.”194
Relegating access to our pooled data to the whims and willingness of business is problematic for several reasons. First, there is a risk
of selection bias in both the types of studies for which access is
granted—and the researchers who receive access.195 Access may only
be granted to researchers who have views or hypotheses agreeable to
the company. Indeed, access to data may even be a recruiting tool for
business to attract talent to affiliate with the company.196 Similarly,
only certain sets of data may be made available, potentially dictating
the research agenda for what can be studied—and even potentially
biasing the outcomes of results.
Even after data are provided, studies that yield embarrassing
results for a business may lead to restrictions on access or loss of
access to the data. Even the risk of lost access may lead researchers to
be cautious about publishing results that might risk the ire of the gatekeepers to valuable data. Even worse, access may be conditioned on
reporting only certain kinds of favorable findings or prepublication
review. Overarching all these concerns, even if there is no conflict or
bias, there remains a risk of the perception of conflict or bias that
harms trust in the research and researchers.
Even when shared, data may be too limited in format, content, or
permissions to enable the study of certain important questions such as
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the impact of poverty on important outcomes.197 Access to
researchers also may become a commodity for which prohibitive
prices may be charged, potentially shutting out public interest
research that is not well-funded.198 Some business might choose not to
share data at all, meaning that the public is locked out of the benefits
of their pooled data. Companies that are more progressive in sharing
data might also risk backlash for doing so.199 A recognized legal right
to access for public interest research may actually take heat off companies from consumers for granting access to valuable information for
the benefit of the public.
2.

Deciding What Constitutes a Public Interest Use

A statutory solution would be to explicitly recognize a right of
access to pooled consumer data held by private entities for research in
the public interest. The statutory duty would apply to companies that
amass large volumes of consumer information during delivery of
goods and services, with exceptions for small businesses that cannot
bear the expenses of the additional regulatory burdens of facilitating
data access, review of proposals, and sharing.
Abstract, often interchangeably used terms such as “public benefit,” “public interest,” “common good,” and “public good,” are often
used in public policy and law despite definitional and procedural challenges in determining what will benefit the public overall.200 Defining
the public interest is particularly a challenge in partisan times when
one person’s public interest is another person’s political agendapushing.201 The rapid spread of misinformation means that even scien43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 53 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

197 See HARRIS & SHARMA, supra note 189, at 4 (noting researcher concerns about the
limitations of data that are shared and the potential impact on poverty research).
198 See, e.g., Stempeck, supra note 196 (“Twitter . . . sells access to a range of real-time
APIs to marketing platforms, but the price point often exceeds researchers’ budgets. To
accelerate the pursuit of knowledge, Twitter has piloted a program called Data Grants
offering access to segments of their real-time global trove to select groups of
researchers.”).
199 Sarah Zhang, Big Pharma Would Like Your DNA, ATLANTIC (July 27, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/big-pharma-dna/566240 (discussing the
backlash to 23andMe, a DNA testing company, as a result of sharing consumer genetic
information with drug-developing companies).
200 See, e.g., INST. OF CHARTERED ACCTS. IN ENG. & WALES (ICAEW), ACTING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 2–12 (2012), https://www.icaew.com/-/
media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/public-int-rep-web.ashx?la=en [hereinafter ICAEW,
ACTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST] (offering a deep discussion of such challenges for a
professional body of accountants, showing that these definitional and procedural
challenges exist across professional domains).
201 See, e.g., id. at 2 (“Invoking the public interest requires justification of an ability and
right to decide what is for the greater good, in the face of a natural suspicion that those
proposing an action in the public interest are actually acting in their own interests.”); Jane
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tifically backed public health measures, such as those aimed at curbing
a pandemic, are challenged as political ploys or conspiracies to undermine rather than protect the public.202 Ideologically motivated reasoning leads people to discount policy purposes that do not conform
to preexisting beliefs and amplify other, potentially spurious claims or
causes that conform with prior beliefs.203 The inevitable risk of contestation over what counts as public interest is an important consideration—but one that the law navigates all the time in diverse domains
and even different legal jurisdictions.204
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Johnston, Whose Interests? Why Defining the ‘Public Interest’ Is Such a Challenge,
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/whose-interests-why-defining-the-publicinterest-is-such-a-challenge-84278 (Jan. 22, 2019, 7:17 PM) (explaining how oft-used terms
such as “public good,” “public interest,” “common interest,” and “common good” are hard
to precisely define—a task that has sparked “[c]enturies of scholarship” from “some big
names in political philosophy”).
202 See, e.g., Jessica Jaiswal, Caleb LoSchiavo & David C. Perlman, Disinformation,
Misinformation and Inequality-Driven Mistrust in the Time of COVID-19: Lessons
Unlearned from AIDS Denialism, 24 AIDS & BEHAV. 2776, 2777 (May 21, 2020)
(discussing resistance to COVID-19 public health measures and the spread of
misinformation (potentially inadvertent falsehoods) and even deliberate disinformation);
Fabio Tagliabue, Luca Galassi & Pierpaolo Mariani, The “Pandemic” of Disinformation in
COVID-19, 2 SN COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL MED. 1287, 1287–88 (2020) (discussing the
spread of “conspiracy or denial ideas” regarding COVID-19); WHO, UN, UNICEF,
UNDP, UNESCO, UNAIDS, ITU, UN Global Pulse & IFRC, Joint Statement: Managing
the COVID-19 Infodemic: Promoting Healthy Behaviours and Mitigating the Harm from
Misinformation and Disinformation (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/23-092020-managing-the-covid-19-infodemic-promoting-healthy-behaviours-and-mitigating-theharm-from-misinformation-and-disinformation (discussing how misinformation and
disinformation on public health responses “costs lives” by “amplifying hate speech;
heightening the risk of conflict, violence and human rights violations; and threatening longterms [sic] prospects for advancing democracy, human rights and social cohesion”).
203 See, e.g., Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman & Fay Lomax Cook, The Influence of
Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion, 36 POL. BEHAV. 235, 237 (2014)
(explaining how “[m]otivated directional reasoning causes people to seek out information
that confirms their existing beliefs . . . , counter-argue and dismiss information inconsistent
with their existing beliefs regardless of the belief’s objective accuracy . . . , and view
evidence consistent with their prior opinions as stronger”); Erik C. Nisbet, Kathryn E.
Cooper & R. Kelly Garrett, The Partisan Brain: How Dissonant Science Messages Lead
Conservatives and Liberals to (Dis)Trust Science, 658 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 36, 37–40 (2015) (explaining the impact of ideologically motivated reasoning in
partisan perceptions of whether policies are beneficial or a waste of money).
204 See, e.g., Australian Law Reform Comm’n, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital
Era (Discussion Paper No. 80, Mar. 2014) § 31.03.2014, proposal 8–2 (proposing a list of
public interest considerations such as public health, national security, economic wellbeing,
and freedom of expression that Australian courts should consider in enforcing privacy
protections); Media: Assessing the Public Interest in Cases Affecting the Media, CPS, https://
www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/media-assessing-public-interest-cases-affecting-media
(Nov. 11, 2019) (defining factors that UK prosecutors must consider to determine whether
a prosecution of media actors is in the public interest); Stephen M. King, Bradley S.
Chilton & Gary E. Roberts, Reflections on Defining the Public Interest, 41 ADMIN. &
SOC’Y 954, 955 (2009) (outlining how the Federal Communications Commission applies its
“public interest” standard).
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Administrative agencies such as the historical Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), have long used the
“public interest” as a standard to guide action.205 As the administrative state grew after the Industrial Revolution and during World War
II, the idea of the public interest was “a central concern in the exercise
of discretion and the responsible use of expertise in determining and
modifying public policies.”206 Today, agencies such as the FCC
continue to implement laws and regulations that use the public
interest as a standard.207 For example, the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, requires that the FCC allocate licenses to use the
radio and television broadcast spectrum based on a finding “that
public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the
granting thereof.”208 The public interest standard “no doubt leaves
wide discretion and calls for imaginative interpretation.”209 The
important term “public interest” was not defined by Congress; rather
the FCC was entrusted with developing the meaning in its decisionmaking processes.210
Despite a venerable history of scholars wrestling with the term
“public interest” and its frequent synonyms such as “public benefit,”
these concepts remain firmly ensconced in law and policy because, as
political scientist Richard E. Flathman put it, “[w]e are free to
abandon the concept, but if we do so we will simply have to wrestle
with the problems under some other heading.”211
Rather than fixed by one definition or frozen in time, the concept
of what constitutes the public interest is under constant review and
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 54 Side A
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205 See, e.g., PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 138–65 (1967 ed. 1936) (discussing the widespread use of the concept among
agencies as early as 1936 despite the dearth of a definition); Orion F. White & Cynthia J.
McSwain, The Phoenix Project: Raising a New Image of Public Administration from the
Ashes of the Past, 22 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 3, 4–29 (1990) (discussing the use of the concept of
the public interest to guide administrative action).
206 Gary S. Marshall & Enamul Choudhury, Public Administration and the Public
Interest: Re-Presenting a Lost Concept, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 119, 122 (1997).
207 King et al., supra note 204, at 955 (investigating “the public interest standard of the
Federal Communications Commission”).
208 Communications Act of 1934, §§ 309(a), 310(d), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)).
209 FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
210 Communications Act of 1934 § 303(r) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303(r))
(providing that “the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires, shall . . . [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of [the Act]”).
211 RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE
NORMATIVE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS 13 (1966).

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 54 Side B

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU502.txt

1476

unknown

Seq: 39

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

15-NOV-21

16:55

[Vol. 96:1438

11/18/2021 14:12:20

212 GARY L. WAMSLEY, ROBERT N. BACHER, CHARLES T. GOODSELL, PHILIP S.
KRONENBERG, JOHN A. ROHR, CAMILLA M. STIVERS, ORION F. WHITE & JAMES F. WOLF,
REFOUNDING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 40–41 (1990).
213 Australian Law Reform Comm’n, supra note 204, § 31.03.2014, prop. 8-2.
214 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), COM (2020), 767 final, 15–22 (Nov.
25, 2020).
215 Id. at 23.
216 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Governing amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair DecisionMaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809, 810–12
(1994) (discussing the impact of procedural justice on perceptions of legitimacy of policies
and outcomes).
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determination through application.212 Indeed, some experts have
counseled that it is better not to define the term public interest or
public benefit, instead providing a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider such as public health, safety, and economic wellbeing to guide
interpretation via adjudication.213
The European Commission’s proposal to streamline consent and
access to data released for “altruistic purposes” offers insights into a
broad open-ended approach to defining what constitutes a public
good purpose.214 The proposed Data Governance Act refers to consensual data releases for “purposes of general interest such as scientific research purposes or improving public services.”215
Ultimately, determining what constitutes a public interest use is a
procedural design issue, rather than a definitional one because procedural fairness confers legitimacy in policy and decisionmaking.216 Two
crucial procedural design issues are: (1) who or what gets to decide
whether a proposed use is in the public interest, and (2) under what
procedure? Fortunately, these important design questions do not face
a blank slate—rather, there are venerable, time-tested procedures for
review of research proposals that weigh the anticipated public benefit
from research against the potential harms of accessing potentially sensitive data. The next Part details the institutional design and review
lessons from institutional review board scrutiny of research proposals
seeking to access and use data. These procedures that underpin
advances in science and medicine can inform the design of procedures
for determining who gets to access and use pooled consumer data for
public benefit purposes and how to redress the risk of privacy and
related harms.
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III
REALIZING A PUBLIC RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM
PRIVATELY HELD CONSUMER BIG DATA
Recognizing a right of public interest access to our common
resource of pooled personal information presents important questions
of institutional and procedural design to maximize benefits while
reducing harms. Sharing consumer data for common-benefit purposes
presents the risk of a big data era version of the tragedy of the commons.217 This is not insurmountable. Rather, we can draw insights
from medical and health science research, which offer time-tested procedures for reviewing claims of public benefit from using sensitive
data and offering access while safeguarding some of our most sensitive
information.218 Strategies of controlled access—ensuring that only
those qualified and competent to use and protect data may obtain the
information—can provide the benefits of big data sharing while
preventing privacy and related harms.219 This Part proposes a
controlled-access model of data sharing and also recommends creating
statutory safe harbors or regulatory sandboxes so that businesses have
the right incentives to share useable data to enrich the public, not just
retain key information for private profit.
A.

Preventing the Tragedy of the Data Commons: Privacy and
Related Harms

11/18/2021 14:12:20

217 Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(offering the classical account of the tragedy of freedom in a commons with the example of
cattle overgrazing rangeland because of uncontrolled use).
218 See discussion infra Section III.B.
219 See, e.g., FAN, CAMERA POWER, supra note 3, at 195–204 (discussing how controlled
access can facilitate access to police-worn body camera videos for violence prevention and
civil liberties protection research while protecting against privacy harms).
220 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ.
L. REV. 339, 373 (2017) (explaining that data are “nonrivalrous, because [they] can easily
and cheaply be copied and shared, at least technologically” and “data collectors and
analyzers have the potential to sell or license their data sets to multiple users”).
221 See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48–49, 73–76, 142–44
(1988) (discussing the problems with open-access and intermediate communal property
regimes using the example of the lobster gangs of Maine); Hardin, supra note 217, at 1244
(discussing resource depletion as the tragedy of freedom in a commons).
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Unlike tangible natural resources like fisheries or rangelands,
data do not get used up when shared—constituting what economics
and property scholars call a “nonrivalrous” good.220 Because data do
not diminish when shared, in some ways they seem particularly wellsuited for the freedom of a commons, avoiding the classic tragedy of
the commons in which unconstrained use leads to depletion and
destruction of the resource.221 Historically, commons treatment was
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See Rose, supra note 22, at 717–18 (discussing the “plenteous good” rationale).
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 90–102 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS]; see also, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 15
(2002).
224 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 223, at 90–92.
225 Id. at 93, 101.
226 Id. at 101.
227 Id. at 100.
228 Id. at 94–99.
223
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accorded to “plenteous goods”—goods like the ocean that were
thought to be so abundant that it was not worth restricting their
use.222 Data are similarly plenteous.
Yet the overabundance of data is actually part of the problem.
Making a commons of pooled personal data presents a modern update
to the tragedy of the commons in which the harm is not depletion of
the resource but rather the risk of multiplication of privacy and
related harms from sharing, duplicating, and spreading the resource.
Indeed, privacy is the preeminent justification today for limiting the
sharing of big data. The risk of proliferating privacy harms looms as
one of the most formidable objections against recognizing a right of
public interest access to our pooled personal data.
The response to the objection cannot simply be to accept the
status quo. Rather, we must determine some way to manage this contemporary configuration of the tragedy of the commons. This is fundamentally a question about the governance of common-pool resources.
In groundbreaking work that earned the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences, Elinor Ostrom delineated eight important principles for governing common-pool resources.223 For the electronic data
context, the list can be winnowed to five informative insights. First, a
common-pool resource is not necessarily open to all, but who or what
entities are qualified to access the resource must be clearly defined.224
Second, entities with access and use rights must have recognized space
to formulate rules of organization and monitoring without top-down
exclusive governmental control.225 While governmental rules can provide scaffolding, within that scaffolding there must be space and recognition for self-regulatory activities.226 Third, there must be rapid
access to low-cost, potentially informal conflict resolution mechanisms
to address ambiguities and conflicts.227 Fourth, there must be graduated sanctions to address violations of the operational rules.228 Fifth,
entities with access and use rights can supplement monitoring by
formal legal government structures, which are more cumbersome and
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potentially less nimble and savvy than participants in the shared
resource.229
Ostrom’s insights can inform how access and use rights for our
pooled personal data should be governed. First, the right of the public
to benefit from our common pool resource of data does not mean
unfettered public access. Rather, access must be controlled through
clear standards, definitions, and review processes for researchers with
the training and capacity to utilize the data to contribute to public
knowledge or produce other public benefits and provide data security.
Second, the review and access procedures should incorporate rules of
organization and monitoring that have arisen within the professional
spheres of scientific research and business with a proven track record
of successful regulation. Third, there must be provision for low-cost,
potentially informal mechanisms for addressing appeals of denials of
access and to clarify the rules and standards surrounding data access.
Fourth, safe harbors for providing public interest access does not
mean no sanctions at all. Rather, sanctions should be graduated for
both researchers and businesses to give incentives for observing the
rules without altogether chilling effective data sharing. Fifth, in the
place of cumbersome governmental structures, review boards drawing
expertise from industry and nonprofit organizations can provide
mutual monitoring and conflict resolution.
B.

Controlled-Access Strategies for Privacy Protection

229

11/18/2021 14:12:20

Id. at 94.
FAN, CAMERA POWER, supra note 3, at 195–204 (discussing controlled access for
police-worn body camera data to protect against privacy harms while facilitating violence
prevention and civil rights protection research); Mary D. Fan, Private Data, Public Safety:
A Bounded Access Model of Disclosure, 94 N.C. L. REV. 161, 198–203 (2015) (arguing for
bounded access to privately held data of public concern and the merits of this model over
mandated disclosure regimes).
231 See, e.g., COMM. ON STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF CLINICAL TRIAL
DATA, BD. ON HEALTH SCIS. POL’Y, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING
CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK 139–58 (2015) (defining
“controlled access” as “any arrangement whereby data sharers place certain restrictions on
access to or conditions of use of data” and giving examples of possible conditions); John A.
Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 485–94 (1979)
230
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Fortunately, time-tested models for access to sensitive data for
research and harm prevention already exist and incorporate many of
the above principles. These models follow what I term a controlledaccess approach.230 Controlled access means sharing data with professionals who are trained and bounded by professional ethics and institutional review boards to safeguard human subjects against privacy
and other harms.231 The controlled-access approach draws from the

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 56 Side B

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU502.txt

1480

unknown

Seq: 43

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

15-NOV-21

16:55

[Vol. 96:1438

time-tested procedures and safeguards that have advanced knowledge, science, medicine, and population health.232
1.

Safeguarding Our Most Sensitive Data

Medical and epidemiological research draw on large volumes of
highly private and protected health data to protect the public and
detect diseases and risk factors.233 Pooling and sharing data for disease
surveillance is a longstanding practice dating back to the nineteenth
century.234 Without the ability to analyze sensitive health data, trying
to detect threats to population health would be laboring “in the darkness of ignorance.”235
The data that health scientists analyze are some of the most
highly protected and sensitive categories of information recognized
and regulated today, subject to the stringent standards of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).236
HIPAA provides strong privacy protections, reflecting the cultural
view that health information is deeply private and disclosure potentially extremely harmful.237 Yet HIPAA also permits disclosure of
data for research and public health purposes—even extremely sensitive health data with identifiers.238
The model for access to the valuable sensitive information is
shaped by a history of cautionary horror tales that have led to the
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(discussing the rise of institutional review board requirements for researchers and their
institutions).
232 See Matthew R. Sydes, Anthony L. Johnson, Sarah K. Meredith, Mary
Rauchenberger, Annabelle South & Mahesh K.B. Parmar, Sharing Data from Clinical
Trials: The Rationale for a Controlled Access Approach, TRIALS, Mar. 23, 2015, at 1, 5.
233 Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burriss & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s
Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 82
(1999) (explaining that researchers and policymakers can collect vital statistics—including
information about births and deaths, the ethnic and racial makeup of communities, and
risk factors for ill health—after state authorization to assess health needs or risks in a
population which can, if timely published, facilitate legislative action); Scott F. Wetterhall
& Eric K. Noji, Surveillance and Epidemiology (“Public health surveillance is the
cornerstone of epidemiology.”), in THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS 37
(Eric K. Noji ed., 1997).
234 For histories, see, for example, ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL,
FULL DISCLOSURE: THE POLITICS, PERILS AND PROMISE OF TARGETED TRANSPARENCY
142, 183–215 (2007); Denise Koo & Scott F. Wetterhall, History and Current Status of the
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, 2 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 4, 4–8
(1996).
235 See John W. Trask, Public Health Administration: Its Dependence Upon Reports of
Cases of Sickness, 28 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1, 2 (1913).
236 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
237 Roberta B. Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 2164, 2164–68 (2007).
238 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a)(1), 164.512(i), 164.514(e) (2020).
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See THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 132.
See, e.g., Jay Katz, The Nuremberg Code and the Nuremberg Trial: A Reappraisal,
276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1662 (1996); Michael A. Grodin, Legacies of Nuremberg: Medical
Ethics and Human Rights, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1682 (1996).
241 Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1436 (1997).
242 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
“THE MEDICAL CASE,” “THE MILCH CASE” 181–82 (1949), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-II.pdf [hereinafter Permissible Medical
Experiments].
243 National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
244 For a summary, see ELIZABETH A. BANKERT & ROBERT J. AMDUR, INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD: MEMBER HANDBOOK 7–16 (3d ed. 2011).
245 For a discussion, see Todd W. Rice, The Historical, Ethical, and Legal Background of
Human-Subjects Research, 53 RESPIRATORY CARE 1325 (2008).
246 Henry Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
247 THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 132.
240
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development of internal professional ethical standards and external
laws for the use of data from human subjects.239 After World War II,
among the atrocities adjudicated at Nuremberg were brutal medical
experiments by Nazi doctors on prisoners.240 In the scientific realm,
the drive to never again sink to such depravity resulted in the
landmark Nuremberg Code, hailed as “the most important document
in the history of the ethics of medical research.”241 Key requirements
in the Code include voluntary informed consent, a beneficial-good
requirement such that the “degree of risk to be taken should never
exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the
problem to be solved by the experiment,” and the right to withdraw
from experiments without repercussions.242
The laws and customs of research using sensitive human subject
data underwent further development in the United States, where several infamous cases led to the National Research Act of 1974.243 The
federal law created the institutional review board (IRB) system to
regulate research with human subjects.244 The development of protections was spurred by controversial cases of research on people without
their knowledge or informed consent, such as the 1962 study of
thalidomide as a treatment for pregnancy symptoms without
informing the subjects they were taking an experimental drug—which
caused birth defects—and the infamous 1932–1972 Tuskegee syphilis
study, which left syphilis untreated in Black male subjects even after
penicillin became the standard of care.245 The debacles decried in a
1966 New England Journal of Medicine article246 spurred Congress to
act and also resulted in the influential 1978 Belmont Report, drafted
by an expert commission charged by Congress.247
Evaluating whether a proposal produces sufficient benefits to
outweigh potential harms also has a long tradition in the health sci-
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ences. The 1947 Nuremberg Code mandated that the “risk to be taken
should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance” of the reasons for the request.248 The Belmont Report’s influential conception of beneficence also entails maximizing the possible
benefits while minimizing the possible harms.249 Today an important
criterion that IRBs apply is that the “[r]isks to subjects are reasonable
in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”250
As a result of law and internal professional ethical developments,
scientists working with human subjects’ data today regularly apply
numerous safeguards to prevent harms to human subjects.251 Federal
law requires IRBs to ensure that the disclosure or use of human subjects’ data “involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of
individuals” and requires researchers to submit data protection plans
with the following elements:
(1) An adequate plan to protect the identifiers from improper use
and disclosure;
(2) An adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consistent with conduct of the research, unless there is a
health or research justification for retaining the identifiers or such
retention is otherwise required by law; and
(3) Adequate written assurances that the protected health information will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity,
except as required by law, for authorized oversight of the research
study, or for other research for which the use or disclosure of protected health information would be permitted.252

248
249
251
252
253
254
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250

Permissible Medical Experiments, supra note 242, at 182.
THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 132, § B(2).
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2020).
E.g., id. §§ 46, 160, 162, 164; THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 132.
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(1)–(3).
Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(B)–(C).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5.
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To receive IRB approval, researchers also must show that sensitive health data are necessary for the project, and that the project
could not be practicably conducted without the information.253
Sanctions for violations of human subjects’ protections include a phalanx of professional, civil, and criminal penalties.254 The right of controlled public interest access to our pooled data commons can
interface with this well-developed system of safeguards. The procedures and protections already tried and proven in the health sciences
show the feasibility of controlled access to our pool of personal data
for public interest purposes while minimizing the risk of privacy and
other harms.
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The appeal of a controlled-access model of data-sharing is evidenced by the European Commission’s proposed Digital Service
Act.255 The proposal would require “very large online platforms,”
with an average monthly active user base of 45 million or more, to
give data access to “vetted researchers” to investigate “systemic risks”
posed by the operation and use of the platform’s services.256 To be
“vetted,” a researcher must “be affiliated with academic institutions,
be independent from commercial interests, have proven records of
expertise in the fields related to the risks investigated or related
research methodologies, and shall commit and be in a capacity to preserve the specific data security and confidentiality requirements.”257
Limiting access to qualified researchers with the training and capacity
to undertake research in the public interest and protect sensitive
shared data strikes a balance that allows beneficial uses while
reducing potential harms.
2.

Applying Controlled Access to Privately Held Consumer Big
Data

11/18/2021 14:12:20

255 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single
Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC,
COM (2020) 825 final, arts. 25(1), 26(1), 31 (Dec. 15, 2020).
256 Id.
257 Id. art. 31(4).
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To effectively administer the proposed right of access to pooled
consumer data, legislation can specify that a business must provide a
mechanism for researchers to submit proposals and a review process
that evaluates projects and teams to ensure (1) the project is likely to
produce knowledge that benefits the public; (2) the proposed research
team has the professional qualifications to carry out the project; and
(3) the team has the appropriate safeguards and training to protect
shared data and prevent privacy and related harms.
While framing language will vary in the process of negotiation
and codification, the key aspects of the right of public interest access
and use should include recognition that: (1) access to consumer data
for nonprofit research in the public interest poses a different balance
of benefits and risks to individuals and the public than commercial use
of such data; (2) because valuable pools of personal data only exist
because of the individual contributions of the public, the right of the
public to benefit must be recognized; and (3) businesses must provide
a mechanism for public interest access and use of pooled personal
data that includes a review of proposals for merit and the qualifications of the research team to (i) conduct the proposed research,
(ii) protect data that are shared, and (iii) adhere to prevailing ethical
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258 The time-tested ethical standards and review mechanisms to ensure protection of
human subjects, including prevention of privacy harms, are discussed, supra, in Section
III.B.1.
259 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2020).
260 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (2020) (“The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through the
experience and expertise of its members, and the diversity of the members, including
consideration of race, gender, cultural backgrounds, and sensitivity to such issues as
community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and counsel in safeguarding . . .
human subjects.”).
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and institutional review standards for research with sensitive data
involving human subjects.258
As for the composition of boards that get to decide whether a
project sufficiently serves the public interest to justify access, current
practices in the sciences also yield experience-tested approaches. The
IRB or privacy board evaluates researcher qualifications and whether
projects present the likelihood of yielding sufficient public benefits to
justify the disclosure and use of highly private data.259 As for the composition of these gatekeepers, federal law requires at least five members of sufficiently varying professional, demographic, cultural, and
attitudinal backgrounds to have the competence to review the range
of proposals received and promote confidence that the IRB understands, and is protecting, the welfare of human subjects in the
community.260
Similar principles should apply to the composition of review
boards for public interest access to privately held pooled personal
data. The membership of the review boards for the sharing of private
data must promote confidence that the board is protecting and promoting public wellbeing and has the professional competence to do so.
The review boards may be situated externally, such as in a nonprofit
educational institution, or sit in-house in a company. Regardless of
where the structure sits, to ensure competence and promote confidence, the composition must include experts with the professional,
nonpartisan qualifications to review the merits of research proposals
and include a majority of independent members who are not mere
corporate insiders. Corporate entities subject to such data-sharing
requirements would be permitted—and indeed encouraged—to pool
their resources where feasible, such as in supporting shared independent review boards with access to pooled data maintained with safeguards to protect commercially sensitive proprietary information from
unintended uses. The pooling of review boards and data could reduce
the burden on researchers from having to separately apply to
numerous companies for similar types of consumer data.
Despite the reluctance to share data in the private sector, the
growing recognition of the benefits of sharing information has led to
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261 See Heiko Richter & Peter R. Slowinski, The Data Sharing Economy: On the
Emergence of Information Sharing Intermediaries, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 4, 9–10 (2019).
262 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 166–84 (2008) (offering an overview
of the creation of the creative commons by creators of free and open software).
263 Id. at 167–68.
264 Id. at 176.
265 Id. at 181.
266 See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 549 (2015).
267 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002) (reporting on the prevalence of
FRAND terms).
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the development of data-sharing platforms to facilitate access.261 Such
data-sharing platforms, coupled with a legitimate proposal review procedure, can reduce the inefficiencies of navigating patchworks of
information held by different private entities.
Creating a right of public access does not need to vitiate the
existing recognition of property protections in compiled data—and
indeed can leverage and build upon that stable baseline. The successes
of the open innovation movement show how providing property protections can also create a foundation for a thriving creative commons.262 Software copyright holders launched a flourishing creative
commons by granting access to their intellectual property via General
Public Licenses that required users also to commit to keeping innovations resulting from access to the intellectual property via the licenses
free and open.263 The result is “a virtuous cycle” in which improvements are also given back to the commons.264
Today a sophisticated Creative Commons for copyrighted works
has emerged in which authors of works can choose a menu of rights
they wish to reserve and terms on which they will share their intellectual property.265 Patent holders have joined the open innovation
party, using patent pledges to the public to spur the spread of technology platforms and standards such as Wi-Fi wireless network protocols or the 4G LTE wireless communication standard, advancing
shared interests and collective goals.266 The sharing of patented material typically proceeds under licenses such as the FRAND commitment, an acronym referring to terms that are “fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory.”267
The implementation of a right to access also can build from the
current baseline of property protections for data compiled by companies. A right of access does not mean a free-for-all grab by all comers.
Businesses have the incentives and expertise to evaluate the necessary
data protection safeguards that researchers must have in place to prevent privacy and other harms. Access can proceed on a license model
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with requirements for data protection, knowledge sharing, and a
demonstrated likelihood of benefitting the public.
C.

Safe Harbors and Regulatory Sandboxes for Public Interest
Sharing

11/18/2021 14:12:20

268 See HARRIS & SHARMA, supra note 189, at 16 (“There is currently no high-profile
governmental or private sector mechanism that provides a social incentive for companies
to share data in support of academic projects that benefit society, but may not be closely
aligned with a company’s research interests or mission.”).
269 See King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9 (discussing challenges).
270 See King & Persily, A New Model, supra note 191, at 705–06.
271 King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9.
272 See supra Section I.A; see also King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9
(“The greatest barrier we have faced concerned Facebook’s interpretation of the relevant
privacy restrictions contained in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) from
the European Union and the consent decree they operate under with the Federal Trade
Commission.”).
273 Cecilia Kang, $5 Billion Fine for Facebook on User Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2019,
at A1; see also King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9 (“However, we are
not the ones who have had to pay a five billion dollar fine in the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, and we would not be on the hook if our legal interpretation did not win
the day in court or with regulators.”).
274 See King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9 (“The privacy protective
procedures instituted mean that researchers will not be able to learn about any individual
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Currently there are considerable risks and scant incentives for
companies to share data with external researchers for public interest
purposes.268 Consider again the difficult negotiations for the release of
data on web pages shared by Facebook users.269 In 2019, prominent
scholars and pioneers in industry-academic partnerships, Gary King
and Nathaniel Persily, announced an innovative partnership model
with Facebook for the release of what would be one of the largest
social science datasets ever available.270 They thought it would take
about two months of work until the release of the data—instead, it
took twenty months because of difficult negotiations over how to
release data useable for research while satisfying privacy laws.271
One of the major challenges that shadowed and constricted the
endeavor was the entry into effect of the GDPR—and the severe
sanctions it imposes, as discussed in Section I.A.272 Reluctance to
share was intensified by the $5 billion fine and extensive Federal
Trade Commission oversight that Facebook incurred after the
Cambridge Analytica data breach scandal, in which a political consulting firm obtained the data of tens of millions of Facebook users in
an effort to learn how to manipulate potential voters.273 The data
Facebook ultimately released had details obscured using differential
privacy techniques that perturb data through censoring and noise,
making the studies of individuals and small groups infeasible.274
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The difficult negotiations—shadowed by privacy laws—led King,
Persily, and Harvard’s Social Science One, which is dedicated to
building industry-academic research partnerships for science, to call
for “safe harbors specifically for research on social media data.”275
Going further, these pioneers of public-private sector data-sharing
also dreamed of a “mandate that these companies share privacyprotected data with independent academics under a broad regulatory
regime aimed at transparency.”276 This Section presents two proposals
to create the incentives and fertile environment for sharing privately
controlled consumer data: statutory safe harbors for public interest
sharing and regulatory sandboxes.
1.

Statutory Safe Harbors

Statutory safe harbors from sanctions arising from data sharing
for public interest purposes can help redress this imbalance in risks
and incentives. The law frequently uses safe harbors from liability to
incentivize desired behavior or foster the development of new innovations.277 For example, antitrust law enforcement agencies have created

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 60 Side A
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or their actions, and small groups will also be obscured in the data which may make certain
valid research questions impossible.”); Liu, supra note 77, at 493–94 (explaining
differential privacy techniques).
275 King & Persily, Facebook URLs Dataset, supra note 9.
276 Id.
277 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (providing a safe harbor from infringement liability
for making, using, importing, selling, or offering to sell “a patented invention . . . which is
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques”);
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing a
limited “experimental use” exception to patent infringement); see also infra notes 278–82
(discussing informational safe harbors in antitrust law and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s safe harbor provisions); Bidwell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 685 F.3d 613, 615 (6th
Cir. 2012) (noting new Department of Labor regulations that created safe harbors from
fiduciary liability for pension plan administrators who invested in certain types of riskier
short-term investments with a potential for higher yields to create incentives for such
investments); ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN,
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 5:276 (2d ed. 2021) (noting “the 1995
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (‘PSLRA’), which contains a
safe harbor from liability for many types of forward-looking statements if they are
accompanied by ‘meaningful cautionary statements,’ has lent a new incentive to risk
disclosure under the federal securities laws” (internal citations omitted)); Judson D.
Stelter, Note, The IRS’ Classification Settlement Program: Is It an Adequate Tool to Relieve
Taxpayer Burden for Small Businesses That Have Misclassified Workers as Independent
Contractors?, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 451, 461 (2008) (noting the safe harbor in the tax code
“for employers who have misclassified employees as independent contractors . . . so long as
the employer meets three requirements: reporting consistency, substantive consistency, and
a reasonable basis for the classification”). See generally Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of
Trust in Human Subjects Research: The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of
Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 397 (2003) (discussing the advantages of creating safe harbors
instead of a list of prohibitions to incentivize desired behaviors).
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“safety zones” for the sharing of information between business competitors that will not incur liability to encourage certain kinds of information exchanges, for example to coordinate cybersecurity.278
Another antitrust safety zone for competitor communication of information is recognized to facilitate collaborative research and development efforts under certain kinds of innovation market conditions.279
Famously—or infamously to scholars who think the training
wheels should come off—statutory safe harbors also fostered the
growth of the Internet through protections for Internet Service
Providers (ISPs).280 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
passed in 1998, immunized ISPs from monetary damages for providing
several key services, including: (1) Internet access, (2) temporary
storage or caching of data, (3) passively storing or hosting user materials, and (4) giving users location tools, such as linking to content on
various websites.281 Public or nonprofit institutions of higher education that act as ISPs also received a safe harbor from liability for
copyright-infringing acts by faculty members and graduate students.282
Whether and when safe harbors like these outgrow their usefulness
and should sunset is a different debate. The point is that safe harbors
can be useful in encouraging socially beneficial innovation and
behaviors.
Selling data to third parties for commercial exploitation is fundamentally different than sharing data for public interest purposes to
researchers subject to the external review and ethical safeguards used

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 60 Side B
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278 Michael Bloom, Information Exchange: Be Reasonable, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec.
11, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2014/12/informationexchange-be-reasonable; FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
POLICY STATEMENT ON SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION 3–9 (2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/04/department-justice-federal-trade-commissionantitrust-policy-statement.
279 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 26–27 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaborationamong-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf (creating a research and development
communication safe harbor “in an innovation market where three or more independently
controlled research efforts in addition to those of the collaboration possess the required
specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in R&D that is a close
substitute for the R&D activity of the collaboration”).
280 For a discussion, see, for example, Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the
National Information Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 332–43, 350–63 (2013)
(explaining safe harbors and the novel ways in which they promote the growth of speech
infrastructure); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
233, 235–38 (2009) (explaining how safe harbors interact with vicarious liability); Mark A.
Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101,
104–05 (2007) (discussing safe harbors pertaining to internet intermediaries).
281 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(e).
282 Id. § 512(e).
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in scientific research. The rules and risks of liability for philanthropic
data sharing should also be different to incentivize socially desirable
conduct. While the details and statutory language will vary with political negotiations and compromises to secure passage, the key elements
of a safe harbor provision should: (1) distinguish between commercial
use of pooled personal data and sharing with external researchers
from the nonprofit sector for public interest purposes, and (2) curtail
and limit the damages and fines that are otherwise applicable for
infringements, such as data breaches, that arise from transfers of data
to researchers for public interest purposes so long as there was a
good-faith, reasonable review of the researchers’ qualifications and
capabilities to provide data security.
As discussed in Section III.B.1, researchers have extensive experience and review processes for protecting and using some of the most
sensitive data available—the health information of human subjects.283
The risk of sanctions from one-size-fits-all liability rules should not
chill data sharing, or force release of data so censored and perturbed
that much important utility is lost.284
2.

Regulatory Sandboxes

283

11/18/2021 14:12:20

See supra Section III.B.1.
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
285 See, e.g., Ivo Jenik & Kate Lauer, Regulatory Sandboxes and Financial Inclusion 1
(Oct. 2017) (working paper), https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/
Working-Paper-Regulatory-Sandboxes-Oct-2017.pdf (“A regulatory sandbox is a
framework set up by a financial sector regulator to allow small scale, live testing of
innovations by private firms in a controlled environment (operating under a special
exemption, allowance, or other limited, time-bound exception) under the regulator’s
supervision.”).
286 Aaron Martin & Giulia Balestra, Using Regulatory Sandboxes to Support
Responsible Innovation in the Humanitarian Sector, 10 GLOB. POL’Y 733, 733–34 (2019).
287 See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis & Douglas W. Arner,
Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 64 (2017) (describing the basics of setting up a regulatory sandbox).
284
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Another approach would draw on a more recent policy development to encourage innovation by private firms—regulatory sandboxes.285 According to the first governmental authority to deploy the
concept, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority, the fundamental idea
behind a regulatory sandbox is to create a safe space for innovation
and experimentation by relaxing regulations and punishments when
businesses or organizations test new approaches, products, or technologies.286 Entities applying to regulators for regulatory sandbox treatment have to ensure they apply safeguards to protect consumers or
other protected persons or entities from the adverse effects of the
experimentation.287
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See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579 (2019).
CFPB Office of Innovation Proposes “Disclosure Sandbox” for Companies to Test
New Ways to Inform Consumers, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2018), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/cfpb-office-innovation-proposes-disclosuresandbox-companies-test-new-ways-inform-consumers.
290 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, U.S. Financial Regulatory Agencies Join
the Global Financial Innovation Network (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2019-221.
291 See, e.g., Martin & Balestra, supra note 286, at 735 (describing how regulatory
sandboxes may be used by humanitarian actors).
292 See Jenik & Lauer, supra note 285, at 2; Martin & Balestra, supra note 286, at
733–34.
293 Martin & Balestra, supra note 286, at 733–34.
294 See, e.g., NSW GOV’T (AUST.), BRINGING BIG IDEAS TO LIFE: NSW INNOVATION
STRATEGY 7 (2015), https://www.acs.org.au/content/dam/acs/acs-documents/NSW_
Government_Innovation_Strategy_Document.pdf (relaxing data privacy regulations and
related potential barriers under certain circumstances to foster innovation).
289
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Thus far, regulatory sandboxes are most known in the United
States as a strategy by financial industry regulators to encourage innovation in financial technology.288 The U.S. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) was the first domestic regulatory authority
to formally announce plans to deploy a regulatory sandbox for companies to test new strategies for consumer disclosures.289 Other U.S. regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have
announced plans to join a cross-border regulatory sandbox effort.290
Globally, regulatory sandboxes are a growing phenomenon
extending to sectors beyond the financial industry.291 Recently, publicsector scholars and officials have proposed appropriating the privatesector use of regulatory sandboxes typically used to foster business
innovation to serve humanitarian goals.292 For example, regulatory
sandboxes can help nongovernmental organizations and international
organizations address regulatory challenges and uncertainties that
inhibit partnerships to share sensitive data to respond to refugee crises
in a timely, effective, and coordinated manner.293 Regulatory sandboxes may relieve organizations of certain privacy restrictions for limited approved purposes where the benefits outweigh the risks of
regulatory relaxation.294
The concept of a regulatory sandbox also can be used to
encourage businesses to share consumer big data for limited public
benefit purposes, with controlled-access protections in place to reduce
the risks of harm. In this regulatory sandbox constructed for the purpose of facilitating research to benefit the public, companies that
share consumer big data with such protections in place would not be
subject to the onerous privacy regulations and potentially severe pun-
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ishments of regimes such as the GDPR.295 This would help alleviate
the pressure on companies to release data that are so masked and
distorted that their research value is severely reduced.296
Sharing that fosters knowledge creation requires useable data.
For example, free and open-source software made available under the
General Public License granted public access “to the human-readable
‘source code’ rather than just the inscrutable ‘machine code,’ ” to
permit innovators to “understand, tinker, and modify.”297 With safe
harbors or regulatory sandboxes in place, the unfortunate incentives
for companies to withhold or obscure data from researchers are
corrected.
Sharing of consumer data for public benefit purposes is generally
nonrivalrous with use by private companies for profitmaking—for
example, the information remains lucrative for customization of
advertising even if it is shared with safeguards to researchers to prevent substance abuse, suicides, or accidental overdoses.298 Indeed, it is
in the interest of companies, as well as the public, to show potentially
beneficial uses of the deluge of data, particularly in times of growing
consternation and hostility toward the aggregation of information
about us.299 This is an opportune time to recognize the right of the
public to benefit from our valuable pooled consumer big data. Protections that draw on controlled-access models and incentives to foster
innovation can create the conditions to better distribute the benefits
of our pooled personal data while protecting against privacy harms.
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295 For a discussion of the penalties and perverse incentives they create, see supra
Section I.A and text accompanying notes 272–76.
296 See supra Section I.A and notes 271–75 and accompanying text.
297 BOYLE, supra note 262, at 167.
298 See, e.g., Marie C. Baca, What You Do on the Internet Is Worth a Lot. Exactly How
Much, Nobody Knows, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/14/what-you-do-internet-is-worth-lotexactly-how-much-nobody-knows (discussing efforts to quantify the lucrative nature of
consumer data to companies for uses such as targeted advertising and studying consumer
behavior to better sell products); Using Social Media to Better Understand, Prevent, and
Treat Substance Abuse, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://
archives.drugabuse.gov/news-events/news-releases/2014/10/using-social-media-to-betterunderstand-prevent-treat-substance-use (“Researchers can analyze social media
interactions to gain insights into patterns of use, risk factors, and behaviors associated with
substance use.”).
299 See, e.g., Morey et al., supra note 37 (“If companies understand how much data is
worth to consumers, they can offer commensurate value in return for it. Making the
exchange transparent will be increasingly important in building trust.”).
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300 See, e.g., Antonio Neri, We Should Treat Data as a Natural Resource. Here’s Why,
WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/we-shouldtreat-data-as-a-natural-resource-heres-why (advocating for treating data as a natural
resource to be harnessed “to drive progress on some of the world’s most intractable
societal challenges”); Mike Smith, Data Is the World’s New Natural Resource, IBM A/NZ
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/ibm-anz/data-is-the-worlds-new-naturalresource (“Data is the world’s new natural resource, unleashed by the maturation of
artificial intelligence, and holds the potential to generate economic wealth, health and
social wellbeing. As with any natural resource, it must be looked after. Good data
stewardship must be transparent and done for a purpose.”).
301 See supra notes 138–40; see also, e.g., Morey et al., supra note 37 (discussing the
business interest in rebuilding consumer trust).
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There is growing recognition that big data is a natural resource
for which wise stewardship is required.300 Part of the wise stewardship
is ensuring that the public also benefits from pooled personal data
currently largely held by businesses for commercial gain. Distributing
the benefits of big data derived from our personal information and
internet trails to the public is in the interest of businesses as well as
the public, as it would address widespread concern that while people
bear the harms of consumer data collection and aggregation, they do
not reap the benefits.301
The current slew of legislative proposals and enactments focused
on individual privacy protections leaves unaddressed the larger issue
of rights in our pooled personal data.302 One’s personal data is a drop
in the ocean of the value and power of consumer big data. Granting
greater rights of individual control does not answer the larger question of rights in the most valuable and powerful asset—our aggregated
personal data.
This Article provides the foundation for recognizing the right of
the public to benefit from pooled personal data currently controlled
largely for private profit.303 Opening the consumer big data commons
for public benefit does not have to entail a tragedy of the commons in
terms of privacy and related harms.304 Insights from commons governance, open innovation, regulatory advances, and well-established procedures in human subjects protection can inform a model of
controlled access and use of our pooled personal data to allow public
participation in the benefits of the resource, while mitigating the risk
of harm.305

